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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This report has been prepared in accordance with Article  1  09j(l) of the Treaty which 
requires the Commission to report to the Council on the progress made in the fulfilment 
by the Member States of their obligations regarding the achievement of economic and 
monetary union (EMU). The European Monetary Institute (EMI) is similarly required to 
report to the Council. 
These reports are the first steps of the procedure set out in Article 109j  which leads to 
the Council, meeting in the composition of  the Heads of  State or Government, deciding 
for the first ,time, not later than31 December 1996, whether a majority ?f  the Member 
States fulfils the necessary conditions for the adoption of a single currency and whether 
it is  appropriate for the Community to enter the third stage. 
In practice it has been clear for some time that, despite the considerable progress made 
by Member States with all aspects of  convergence and with other preparations for EMU, 
a  majority  of Member  States  has  not  yet  achieved  a  sufficiently  high  degree  of 
sustainable convergence.  This is notably because many Member States have not yet 
reached a satisfactory situation as regards the sustainability of  the government fmancial 
situation.  The  European  Council in ·Madrid in  December 1995  already  came  to  the 
conclusion that conditions would not be appropriate for an early start to the third stage 
but confirmed that the thirdstage of  EMU would indeed begin on 1 January 1999. This 
agreement on the starting date wa5  reiterated by the European Council in Florence in 
J 
June 1996. The decisions about which Member States will be in the first group adopting 
the single currency will be made as early as possible in 1998. 
The role of  the present report, apart from meeting the formal requirements of  the Treaty, 
is thus,  firsf,  to  examine the current state of. convergence and of the compatibility of 
national legislation with Treaty obligations and, second, to review the progress that has 
been made since the beginning of  stage two ofEMU on 1 January 1994. 
The  structure  of the  report  follows  that  established  by  Article 109j(l).  Chapter 2 
examines the compatibility betWeen each Member State's national legislation (including 
the statutes of its national central bank) and Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty and the 
Statute of the ESCB. The following four chapters (Chapters 3-6) examine in tum the 
convergence performance· of  the Member "States in relation to each cif the four criteria, 
concerning price stability, the government budgetary position, exchange rates and long-
term interest rates. Chapter 7 looks at developments in several other areas that arc to be 
taken account of in the Commission and EMI reports:  development of the ECU, the 
results of the integration of  markets, the balances of  payments on current account, and 
unit labour costs and other price indices. A final chapter (Chapter 8)  suminarises the 
conclusions of  the report. 
According  to  the  Edinburgh  agreement,  Denmark  has  announced  that  it  will  not 
participate in the third stage of EMU, but that it remains fully committed to taking part 
in economic and monetary cooperation during the second stage of EMU.  With this in 
mind, developments in Denmark have been included in this report. 6 
Similarly, although the United Kingdo111  has notified the Council,  in accordance with 
paragraph 1 ofProtocol No 11, that it docs not intend to move to the third stage in 1997, 
it might do so later and developments in the United Kingdom have also been included in 
this report. 
On the basis of  this report and that of  the EMI the Commission is separately submitting 
to  the Council a recommendation for the assessment by the Council in accordance with 
Article 1  09j(2). 7 
2.  COMPATIBILITY OF NATIONAL  LEGISLATION 'VITH· THE TREATY 
AND THE STATUTE OF THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANKS 
According to the second sentence of  Article 1  09j(l) of the Treaty, the reports drawn up 
under ·this  article  ''shall  include  an  examination  of the  compatibility  between  each 
A1ember State's national legislation,  including the statutes of  its national central bank, 
and Articles 107 and 1qs ofthis Treatymzd the Statute of  the ESCB". 
The  present  chapter  is  devoted  to  this  examination.  The  first  section  summarizes 
adaptations  of national  Jaw  since  the  signing of the  Treaty  on  European  Union  in 
Februal)' 1992. The second section includes a recapitulation of the relevant provisions 
of the  Treaty and  the ESCB  Statute.  The  third  section  summarizes the  results of a 
review of national central bank legislation in the light of these provisions; it  indicates 
types of  provisions which arc still found to be incompatible with. the requirements of  the 
Treaty or the Statute and  which arc expected to.bc changed before the establishment of 
the ESCB. The fourth section indicates legislative refon!1S which are at present planned 
in the perspective of  the _third stage. 
2.1 Adaptation of national law since the sig~ing of the Treaty 
Since the signing of  the Treaty on European Union .and its cntl)' into force,  statutes of 
many national central banks (NCBs) have been adapted in order to  comply with the 
Treaty. 
Some of these changes aimed at ensuring compliance with Article 104 which prohibits 
central  bank credit  to  the public  sector  and  with Article  1  04a which  prohibits  the 
granting ofprivilegcd.access by governmental or public bodies to financial institutions. 
These rules arc in force since the beginning of the second stage. Member States have 
adapted their reguiatol)' framework in a satisfactol)' manner to these requirements, so 
that no significant difficulties have occurcd. 
The statute of the Banque de France was amended in 1993. The responsibility for. the 
formulation and the implementation of  monet:ll)' policy has been vested in a "Moneta!)' 
Policy Council", which must not seck or accept instructions from the government or any 
other body, whilst a "General Council" carries out all other management responsibilities 
at the bank. Furthermore, the objective of the bank to  ensure price stability has been 
redefined. 
The legal regime of the Banco de Espana was adapted in 1994. The law established 
price stability as the primal)' objective of monet:ll)' policy which is to be defined and 
implemented by the bank. Neither the ·government nor any other public authority may 
give instructions to the bUnk  regarding either the objectives or the implementation of 
moneta!)' policy.  · 
In Belgium, an amendment in  1993  restricted opposition and suspension rights of the 
Government  Commissioner and  the  Minister  of Finance  in  matters  concerning  the 8 
definition  and  implementation  of monetary policy,  the  conduct of foreign  exchange 
operations, the holding and management of official foreign reserves and the promotion 
. ofthe smooth operation ofpayment systems. 
In Italy,  the authority to  determine the discount rates has  been transferred  from  the 
Minister of  the Treasury to the Governor of the Banca d'Italia in  1992. Furthermore, the 
Banca d'Italia has been given the responsibility for  setti~g res'erve requirements within 
certain limits and for overseeing payment systems. 
In Portugal, the amendments of  the law on the Banco de Portugal were adopted in 1995. 
The law, inter alia, redefined the primary objective of the bank, i.e.  to  maintain price 
stability, taking into account the overall economic policy of  the government. 
2.2 Recapitulation of relevant provisions of the Treaty and the ESCB Statute 
Article 107 of  the Treaty ensures that the ESCB will operate free from instructions from 
third parties. It  reads as follows: 
"TV/zen exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon tlzem 
by this Treaty and the Statute of  the ESCB, neither the ECB nor a national central bank, 
nor any member of  their dccision-maldng bodies shall seck or take instmctions from 
Community institutions or bodies, from any govemment of  a A1embcr State or  from any 
other body. The Community institutions and bodies and the governments of  the Member. 
States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of  the 
decision-maJ  .. :ing bodies oftlze ECB or of  the national central banks in the performance 
of  their tasks." 
.· Articie  108  of the  Treaty· obliges  Member  States  to  adapt  national  legislation  ill 
accordance with the requirements of  EMU: 
''Each Member State shall ensure,  at the latest at the date of  the establishment of  the 
ESCB,  that its national legislation including the statutes of  its national central bank is 
compatible with this Treaty and the Statute of  the ESCB." 
The article refers to the compatibility of  national legislation with the Treaty's provisions 
in general. This includes compatibility with Article 1  05(1) of  the Treaty· which defines 
the objectives of  the ESCB, the first two sentences ofwhich read as follows: 
"Tize  primary  objective  of the  ESCB  shall  be  to  maintain price  stability.  Without 
prejudice  to  the  objective  of  price stability,  the .ESCB  shall support  the  general 
economic policies in the Commulzity with a view to contributing to the achievement of 
the objectives of  the Community as laid down in Article 2." 
.  . .  .,  . 
The Statute of  the ESCB 1 includes in its Article 14  .. 2 rules on the security of  tenure: 
See Protocol (No 3) of  the Treaty. 9 
"The statutes of  the national central banks shall, in particzilar, provide that the term of 
office of  a Governor of  a national central bank shall be no less than five years. 
A  Governor may be relieved from  office only if  he no  longer fulfils  the  conditions 
required for  the  pe!Jormance  of his  duties  or if he  has  been  guilty  of serious 
misconduct... " 
By each of these four provisions, limits arc put on national central bank legislation: 
•  The prohibitions and obligations formulated in Article 107 apply equally to both the 
ECB and the NCBs in so far as the performance of  ESCB-rclatcd tasks is concerned. 
While the prohibitions formulated in the iirst sentence of  Article I 07 arc addressed to 
the NCBs and to  their decision-making bodies, it appears that rights of third parties 
to  give instmctions  in  some fonn  or other arc incompatible with the  prohibitions. 
Furthermore,  any  national  provisions  of which  the  purpose  or  effect  is  for  the 
government to  seek to  influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the 
NCB in the performance of their tasks therefore need to be brought, in line with the 
second  sentence  of Article  107.  The  term  "decision-making  bodies"  should  be 
understood to mean any organ of an NCB whose decisions may have an impact on 
the fulfilment of  its ESCB-related tasks. 
•  The primary objective formulated in Article 105(1) is assigned to the ESCB, which 
according  to  Article  1.2  of the Statute is  composed of the ECB  and  the NCBs. 
Therefore,  the  objective of each  member of the ESCB  ffi}lSt  be compatible with 
Article 1  05(1). 
•  Article 14.2 of  the ESCB Statute is exclusively addressed to NCBs; non-compliance 
with the limits set therein will require adaptations of  national law. 
•  Apart  from  these  specific provisions in the Treaty and the Statute which require 
compatibility, there arc likely to exist a number of national provisions - often of a 
technical nature - which may prove to be at odds with the prerogatives of the ECB 
vis-a-vis  NCBs  and  which  should  be  eliminated  so  that  the  new  compatible 
provisions become effective at the start of Stage Three for Member States without a 
derogation and at the start of  their full participation in Monetary Union for Member 
States with a derogation initially or with a special status. 
It is worth recalling some provisions which refer to the time-frame for any adjustments 
of  national law and to the geographical coverage of  the respective rules. Right from its 
establishment in early 1998, the ECB will have to take decisions which predetermine 
the  conduct  of its  monetary  policy  as  from  1 .January  1999.  Article.108  therefore 
stipulates that compatibility shall be achieved at tllis 9ate at the latest. Besides, Article 
109e(5) calls upon Member States, as  appropriate, 'to start the process leading to  the 
independence of  its central bank during the second stage. 10 
In relation to the application of Article 107 of the Treaty on central bank independence and 
Article  108 of the Treaty on  the adaptation of national  legislation and NCBs' statutes,  the 
Treaty does not make a distinction between Member States with or without a derogation (sec 
Article 109k(3) of the Treaty). 
Denmark will be treated as a Member State with a derogation (Article 2, Protocol No 12). Its 
central bank statute will therefore have to be compatible with Articles 107 and 108. 
In  the  event  that  the  United  Kingdom  will  not  participate  in  Stage  Three,  Article 2, 
Protocol No 11  will exempt the United Kingdom from the application of  Articles 107 and 108 
of the Treaty. Given the formulation of  Article 1  09e(5), until it notifies that it intends to move 
to the third stage, the United Kingdom is therefore exempted from the  obligation to start the 
process leading to the independence of its central bank. 
It is made clear in Article 107 that the requirements for compatibility with the Treaty and the 
Statute arc  limited to ESCB-relatcd tasks.  Among these  arc  the basic tasks,  laid  down  in 
Article 105(2) of the Treaty and Article 3.1  of  the Statute, which arc to define and implement 
the monetary policy of  the Community, to conduct foreign exchange operations consistent with 
the provisions of Article 109 of the Treaty, to hold and manage the official foreign reserves 
of the Member States and to promote the smooth operation of payment systems. 
2.3. Review of national legislation 
Central bank statutes reflect different national traditions and institutional frameworks and vary 
significantly between Member States with respect to many of  their characteristics like the legal 
form  of the  central  bank,  the  definition  of its  objectives  and  tasks,  monetary  policy 
instruments, relations with the national  parliament and  socio-economic groups, the structure 
and composition of decision-making bodies, and financial rules. Taking Articles 105 and 107 
of the  Treaty  and  Article 14.2  of the  ESCB  Statute  as  benchmarks,  a  review  of present 
legislation in the Member States leads to the following conclusion:  Many characteristics of 
national legislation arc within the limits drawn by EC law. However, in a number of cases 
adaptations  are  called  for.  Legislative  initiatives  for  such  adaptations  have  reached  an 
advanced stage in several Member States (sec section 2.4). 
In a few Member States, legislation allows other bodies to give instructions to the central bank 
in matters of monetary policy.  This is incompatible with the requirements in the third stage 
of EMU. 
In many Member States, other legislative provisions are in force the effect of  which may come 
close to the right of  third parties to give straightforward instructions. Such provisions include 
a right of other bodies to interfere in a decision taken by the ECB, a right to participate in the 
voting on monetary policy, a right to be consulted before the central bank takes a decision, 
insufficient financial autonomy of  the central bank, or membership in decision-making bodies 
of the central bank and in bodies outside the ESCB. In  some cases, the borderline between 
compatible and non-compatible provisions is difficult to draw; however, it is clear that most 
of the existing provisions of this type need to be amended. 11 
In a few Member States, the provisions on  the security of tenure for the Governor are not 
compatible with the provisions of Article 14.2 of the ESCB Statute. 
The box on "Review of central bank legislation:  some illustrative cases" provides examples 
of provisions in national legislation which serve to illustrate the issues at stake. 
2.4 Current legislative initiatives 
In Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Finland and - with a more substantial revision than 
in  1993  - in Belgium, preparatory work on  amendments to national  legislation concerning 
central banking is well under way. 
In Ireland, draft legislation on the Central Bank of Ireland includes provisions on the Bank's 
involvement in payment systems,  the collection of statistics, prudential  supervision and the 
position of the members of decision-making bodies, including the term of office of Directors, 
which is fixed at five years. 
In Luxembourg, a draft law 0n the Institut Monetaire Luxembourgeois and the monetary status 
of Luxembourg  was  submitted  to  Parliament  in  December  1993.  The  law  which  is  still 
pending covers inter alia the IML's objectives and tasks. 
In the Netherlands, discussions between the Ministry of Finance and the Nederlandsche Bank 
with a view to adapting the central bank legislation to the requirements of EMU have reached 
an advanced stage. 
In  Finland,  draft  legislation  in  particular  addresses  the  future  role  of the  Parliamentary 
Supervisory Council in monetary policy, the minimum term of office for the Governor and 
the grounds for dismissal. 
In  Belgium, the government is planning to propose a comprehensive reform of central bank 
legislation in the near future. The draft law aims at compatibility between the Treaty and the 
ESCB Statute on the one side and the statute of the National Bank of Belgium on the other. 12 
REVIEW OF CENTRAL BANK LEGISLATION: 
SOME JI.,LUSTRATIVE CASES 
Comnliance with Article 107 ofthe Treaty 
The following rights  of third  parties seem to  be  at odds with or to impinge  upon the 
prohibitions and commitments formulated in Article I 07: 
a.  A general right to give instructions 
Provisions which  subordinate  NCBs  to instructions  arc  in  contradiction with  their 
obligation not to seck or take instructions. 
Section 4 of  the Bank of  England Act2 
"The  Treasury  may from  time  to  time  give  such directions  to  the  Bank as,  after 
consultation  with  the  Governor  of the  Bank,  they  think necessary  in  the  public 
interest. " 
The right to give such ·instructiqns is  also  incompatible with the Treaty,  when the 
central bank may object but eventually can be defeated. 
Article 26 of  De Nederlandsche Bank Act 
"1.  The Minister may, after consultation with the Bank Council, give such directions 
to the Governing Board as he thinks necessary for the.Bank's policy to be properly 
co-ordinated with  the  Government's  monetary and financial policies.  Except  as 
provided _il.i paragraph  2  below,  the  Governing  Board shall  comply  ·with  such 
directions. 
2.  Jj the  Governing Board has any objections to  the  directions as referred to  in 
paragraph 1 above,  it may communicate  said objections to  the  Crown  in  writing 
within three days of  receiving directions.  The Crown shall decide whether or not the 
directions are to be complied with 
3.  (. . .) 
2  As  already  indicated,  the  provisions  of Protocol  No 11  exempt  the  United Kingdom  from  the 
application of Article 107, unless the United Kingdom notifies that it intends to move to the third 
stage. 13 
4. If  the Crown decides that the directions are to  be complied with,  the Governing 
Board's  objections  and  the  decisions  of the  Crown  shall  be  published  in  the 
Nederlandsche Staatscourant, if  in  the opinion of  the Crown  this is not contrary to 
the national interest. " 
Article 15 oftlze Act on the Bank of  Finland 
"The administration of the Bank and management of the  affairs  thereof shall be 
under the sun,eil/ance of  the Parliamentary SupenJisory Board in  accordance with 
this Act and the Regulations confirmed by Parliament" 
Article I 7oft  he same Act 
"It is the duty of  the ParliamentQiy Supervisory Board to fzx the base rate of  the bank 
and other rates of  interest applied by the bank and the limits thereof'.'. 
b.  A right to approve, suspend, annul or defer a NCB's decision 
Any such provisions constitute a right to  give instructions of a specific type;  the 
assessment is the sanie as for generally formulated rights to give instructions. 
Article 13(2) of  the Bundesbank Act 
"The  members of the Federal Cabinet  are entitled to  attend tlze  meetings (lf the 
Central Bank Council. They have no right to vote, but may propose motions. At their 
request, a decision shall be deferred for up to two weeks." 
c.  A right to censor decisions on legal grounds 
.A  right ofthe Government to control the legality ofdecisions of  a central bank seems 
incompatible with Article 107.  This also applies when the Government's right can 
only be exerted indirectly.  · 
Article 43 of  the Organic Law of  the Banco de Portugal 
"1.  The Governor shall have a casting vote atthe meeting which he chairs and may 
suspend tlze  effectiveness of tlze  decisions. taken  by the Board· of  Directors or by 
executive  committees  which,  in  his judgement ,  are  contrary  to  the  law,  to  the 
in!ercsts of  the country or of  the bank 
2.  The suspension shall be notified to the Government, through the Finance Minister, 
and shall be considered waived, should tlie Cab  inc~ not con  finn it l1.:ithin fifteen days 
after its imposition."  · 14 
d.  A right to participate in decision-making bodies of  a NCB with a right to vote. 
A right  of third  parties  to  vote  in  decisions  related  to  the  tasks  of the  ESCB  as 
defined  in  Article  1  05(2)  is  inconsistent  with  their  commitment  not  to  seck  to 
influence such decisions. 
Article 14 of  the Central Bank Act of  Ireland 
"Tiie·Bank shall be conducted and managed in accordance with this Act by a Board 
of  Directors consisting of (a)  a  Governor and (b)  such number of  other Directors 
(not exceeding nine and not including at any time more than two service Directors) 
as the Minister shall from time to time determine .... Every service Director shall hold 
office at tlze pleasure of  tlze  Minister and may be removed by tlze  }.finister at any 
time. " 
e.  A right to be consulted  before a NCB takes a decision 
Article  107  of the Treaty does  not,  of course,  preclude cooperation and dialogue 
between NCBs and government, parliament or other state bodies. In fact the Treaty 
providt.s  for  such contacts and reporting in a number of provisions.  The point is 
whether the government avails itself of  any formal mechanism of  which the purpose 
is  to  influence the final decision of the NCB.  An explicit duty to  consult political 
bodies prior to  the decision provides for  such a mechanism and  appears not to  be 
compatible with the second sentence of  Article 107. 
Article 42 ofSveriges Riksbank Act 
11 Prior to the Riksbank making a monetary policy decision of  major importance, the 
Cabinet  Minister·  appointed  by  the  Government  shall  be  consulted.  If such 
co'nsultation is not possible and there is exceptional cause,  the Riksbank may make 
such a decision without consultation. 
11 
f.  A right to control ex ante tlie central bank's budget 
As for the previous point, the borderline between constraints to which NCBs must be 
subjected and attempts to influence the members of their decision-making bodies in 
the performance of their tasks is  not easy to  draw in each case.  A NCB  must, of 
course,  be  financially  accountable.  On  the  other hand,  a  requirement  to  have  its 
budget approved beforehand IUay create a situation where a NCB is unable to avail 
itself autonomously ofthe appropriate means to fulfil its mandate. IS 
Article 4.2 of  the Law of  Autonomy of  the Banco de Espaiia 
"The Bank's draft budget for operating expenses and investments, once approved by 
its  Governing  Council  according  to  Article  2J.lg),  shall  be  submitted  to  the· 
Government, which will send it to the Spanish parliament for approval.  The  Bank's 
budget shall be estimative in nature,  and shall not be  consolidated with other state 
public sector budgets." 
g.  Membership of  members of  decision-making bodies in bodies outside the ESCB 
Membership in external bodies may entail conflicts of  interests between the duties vis-
a-vis a NCB (for Governors additionally vis-a-vis the ECB) and the external function. 
However,  it  appears  to  be  difficult  to  establish  a  general  mle  with  respect  to 
compliance or non-compliance of such  membership  with  Article  107.  The point  in 
question is whether the member of the NCB  body executes other tasks which might 
jeopardise his personal independence. 
Article 22 of  the Osterreichische National  bank Act 
"(3)  Only persons holding Austrian citizenship who  are  not debarred from  being 
elected to  the  National  Council  (Nationalrat)  may be  members of the  General 
Council.  The  members of  the  General Co11ncil shall be persons prominent in some 
branch  of  economic  activity  or  jurists  or  economists.  They  shall  include 
representatives of 
1.  banks; 
2.  industry; 
3.  trade and  small businesses; 
4.  agriculture; and 
5.  salaried employees and wage-earners. 
(4)  No person who is in the active service of  the Federal Republic or a Land or who 
is a member of the Nationalrat,  the  Federal Government or the  government of a 
Land may be  a  member of the  General  Council.  171C  restriction  with regard to 
persons in the  active service of the  Federal Republic shall not apply to  university 
professors in  law and economics.  Not  more  than jour members of the  General 
Council may in their main occupation be  a member of the  management of banks; 
such persons may not be a  President or Vice President  of  the Bank." 
Comnliance with Article 14.2 of  the ESCB Statute 
In Article 14.2 of  the Statute, the security of  tenure for Governors is  addressed under the 
aspect of  their term of  office and the grounds for their dismissal. 16 
a.  Tern1 of  office for Governors 
Article 14.2 of  the Statute requires a minimum term of  office for Governors, i.e. five 
years. Consequently, statutes with a shorter term of  office need to be revised. 
Statutes  which do  not explicitly provide  for  a  minimum term  of office meet  the 
minimum tern1 requirement, provided that the grounds for dismissal arc limited to the 
cases specified in the second sub-paragraph of  Article 14.2 ofthe Statute (see below). 
Article 29 of  the statutes of  the Bank of  Greece 
"The Governor and the Deputy Governors  (. .. ) shall be appointed (. .. )  by an  Act of 
the Cabinet, for a period of  four years on proposal of  the Board of  Directors of  the 
Bank(  .. )." 
The statute of  the Banca d'Italia is silent about the term of  office of  the Governor and 
-about grounds for dismissal. 
Article 19 of  the Statute of  the Banca d 'Italia 
"Tize  Board of Directors  may appoint  and dismiss  the  Governor,  the  General 
Manager and the two Deputy General Managers. " 
Article 7  (3) of  the Bzmdesb,ank Act 
"1Jze  President,  the  Vice-P,resident  and the other members of  the Directorate are 
nominated by the Federal Cabinet and appointed by the President of  the Federal 
Republic.  Before making such nominations,  the Federal Cabinet shall consult the 
Central Bank Council. Members of  the Directorate are appointed for eight years, or 
in exceptional cases for a shorter tenn of  office, but not less than two years., 
b.  Grounds for dismissal of  a Governor 
Article 14.2 of the Statute seeks to avoid the arbitrary dismissal of the Governor by 
the authorities involved in the appointment procedure.  As in this  case the Statute 
contains  an  explicit  requirement  on  the  content  of  national  legislation,  any 
contradictory provision would have to be amended. 17 
Article  12(3)  of  the  Act  on  the  establishment  of  the  lnstitut  Monetaire 
Luxembourgeois 
"The Government may propose to the Grand-Duke the dismissal of  the Management  · 
if there  is  a  fundamental  disagreement  between  the  Government  and  the 
Management over the policy of  the Institut and the performance of  its tasks.  In this 
event,  the  proposal  of dismissal  shall  relate  to  the  Management  collectively. 
Likewise,  the  Government  may  propose  to  the  Grand-Duke  the  dismissal  of a 
member of  the 111anagement who becomes permanently unable to perform his duties. 
Before transmitting a proposal to the Grand-Duke, the Government shall consult the 
Council of  the lnstitut. " 
Article 44 of  the Statutes of  the National Bank of  Belgium 
"The governor is appointed and can be dismissed or suspended by the King." 
~omnliance  with Article 105 of  the Treaty 
The requirement that the objectives  of all  members  of the ESCB must coincide with 
Article  105(1)  does  not imply  the  need  to copy in all  instances  the wording of this 
paragraph into national statutes. In fact, the formulation of  a central bank's objectives is 
quite disparate among Member States. This to some extent reflects the fact that central 
bank statutes date from different decades. HoV\ever, any formulation must avoid casting 
doubt as to whether the bank in question is bound by the primary objective as laid down 
in the Treaty. 
Article 1 Act n.JJ6 on Danmarks Nationalbank3 
"Dmrmarks  Nationalbank shall  have  the  object  to  maintain  a  safe  and secure 
currency system in this country,  and to facilitate and regulate the  traffic in money 
and the extension of  credit. " 
3  Since Dc1im:nk has notified the Council that it will not participate in the third stage, there is no 
need to adapt the statute of Danmarks Nationalbank in this respect. 18 
Further statutory requirements to be fhlfilled for NCBs to become an integral Qart of the 
ESCB 
According to Article 14.3 ofthe Statute, national central banks are an integral part of  the 
ESCB and shall act in accordance with the guidelines and instructions of the ECB. The 
scope of  necessary adaptations of  national law - either in central bank statutes or in other 
parts of law - which this  principle implies  will  emerge more clearly in  the process of 
preparatory  work  for  the  ECB'  s  regulatory  framework.  It  is  obvious  that  national 
peculiarities may continue to exist to the extent that the effectiveness and uniformity of 
the single monetary policy are not affected. 
An example where national statutory provisions do  not respect the prerogatives of the 
ECB are rules which provide for competencies of government bodies in  the process of 
issuing banknotes. 19 
3.  PRICE STABILITY 
3.1 Treaty provisions 
The price stability criterion is defined in the first indent of  Article 109j(l) ofthe Treaty:  "The 
achievement of  a high degree of  price stability [ .  .} will be apparent from a rate of  inflation 
which is close to that of, at most, the three best performing Member States in terms of  price 
stability." 
Protocol No 6 on the convergence criteria develops Article 1  09j(1 ), by stipulating in Article 1 
that a Member State is convergent in terms of inflation if it  "has a price performance that is 
sustainable and an average rate of  inflation,  observed over a period of  one year before the 
examination,  that does  not exceed by more than  1  ~percentage points that of.  at most,  the 
three best pe1jorming ·Member States in  terms of  price stability. Inflation shall be measured 
by means of  the consumer price index on a comparable basis, taking into account differences 
in national definitions. " 
National consumer price indices (CPis) diverge substantially in terms of concepts, methods 
and practices. Thus, to meet the requirement of  Protocol No 6 that inflation must be measured 
on a  comparable basis,  the Council adopted  on 23 October 1995  a  framework  Regulation 
(No 2494/95) which provides for a harmonisation of  national CPis in two steps. 
The first  step  required  for the purpose of the report referred to in Article 109j(I), i.e.  the 
present document, was the production by March 1996 of  a se(  of  so-called "interim indices of 
consumer prices" (IICPs), adjusted to  reduce differences in coverage of goods and services 
observed between existing national indices. 
The monthly IICPs have been published as from January 1996 with the time series going back 
to January 1994. As a first step in the harmonisation process, IICPs exclude those categories 
of the national indices  for which existing practices  differ most markedly across  Member 
s·tates. As such, IICPs do not include imputed rents of owner-occupied housing, health and 
educational  services,  and  various  other  items  like  mortgage  interest  payments,  financial 
services, insurance, package holidays and certain local authority services. On the other hand, 
IICPs  incorporate  some  components,  such  as  prices  of alcohol  and  tobacco,  which  arc . 
excluded from  the national  CPis in some Member States. Thciugh not strictly comparable, 
IICPs  arc  for  the  time  being  considered  to  constitute  a  more  comparable  basis  for  the 
assessment of  inflation convergence among Member States than the national CPis. 
The second step, scheduled for January 1997, will be the launch of comparable harmoniscd 
indices (HICPs) based on comrnon.definitions and methods such as the use of a common 
coverage of goods and services for all  Member States and harmonisation of the reference 
period, standards for sampling, frequency of  updating weights, demographic and geographical 
coverage, etc. 20 
3.2 Price stability as assessed by the IICPs 
3.2.1 Recent trends 
The time series for the IICPs are available only from January 1994. As a result, the analysis of 
the inflation trend based on this index cannot start before January  1995.  Since early  1995,  a 
general tendency towards lower and  more convergent inflation has prevailed.  Inflation in  the 
Community as a whole as measured by the IICP (percentage change on a year earlier) stood at 
2.8% in January 1995 and declined to 2.4%_ in  September 1996. This figure is  historically low 
and not £1r from what could be called price stability. 
In the seven Member States where the annual inflation rate was below 2.5% in January 1995 
(Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Finland), the pace of 
price increases either eased further or stabilised at a low level during the subsequent 20 months 
(see Graph 3.1 ).  In three of the four countries where the annual inflation rate ranged between 
2.5% and 3% at the beginning of 1995 (Ireland, Austria and  Sweden, the exception being the 
United Kingdom),  it  edged  down  to  below  2%  in  mid-1996.  The  deceleration  was  most 
noticeable in Sweden where the annual inflation rate cased to below 1% since August of this 
year.  In the United Kingdom,  progress towards price stability has  proved to be gradual  and 
somewhat erratic,  but the downward trend has  been confirmed  during  the  course of 1996, 
despite the context of  a sustained recovery and earlier downward pressure on sterling. 
In the remaining Member States, visible progress has been achieved with inflation performance, 
but the degree of price stability and price convergence is not yet satisfactory. Spain and Italy 
experienced a worrying upward movement in inflation during the first half of 1995 due to both 
the surge in import prices following the marked depreciation of their currencies in  the spring 
and increases in indirect taxation. However, in both countries inflation peaked in the middle of 
1995 and since then a steady downward trend has been clearly discernible.  Inflation stood at 
3.5% in Italy and at 3.6% in Spain in September of this year.But in Spain the deceleration in 
inflation  has  stalled  in  recent  months,  although  underlying  inflation  (excluding  prices  of 
unprocessed food and energy) has continued to edge down.  An upward blip in· inflation also 
took place in Portugal in the spring of  last year, but the upturn was much smaller and reversed 
more quickly than in the previous two countries. However, after having eased to close to 2% 
in March of  this year, inflation has accelerated in recent months, reaching 3.2% in September. 
In Greece, inflation has declined from 10.9% in January 1995 to 8.1% in September 1996, but 




3.2.2 Price convergence measured against a reference value 
. In this report, the following operational definitions have been used (for a discussion of the 
issues involved see the box on the "Calculation of  the infl~tion reference value"). A Member 
Table 3.1 
Inflation convergence 
(inflation measured by the percentage change 
in the JICP) 
Interim indices of 
consumer prices 
Three best  December  September 
performers 
(I) 
1995  1996 
(I). 
B  1.4  -
D  - 1.3 
NL  1.1  1.2 
FIN  1.0  0.9 
Reference  2.7  2.6 
value(2) 
Member States respecting the reference 
value 
Number:  9  10 
out of:  15  15 
B  1.4  1.6 
DK  2.3  2.2 
D  1.5  1.3 
F  1.7  2.1 
IRL{3)  2.4  2.1 
L  1.9  1.3 
NL·  1.1  1.2 
A  2.0  1.7 
FIN  1.0  0.9 
s  - 1.6 
(I) Measured by the percentage change in 
the arithmetic average of  twelve 
monthly indices relative to the 
arithmetic average of  the nvelve 
monthly indices of  the previous period. 
(2) Definition adopted in this report: 
arithmetic average of  the three best' 
performers in terms of  inflation plus 
1.5 percentage 'points. 
(3) Measured on the basis of  quarterly data 
Sourer: Commission services. 
State's inflation is measured by the percentage change 
in  the  arithmetic  average of twelve  monthly indices 
relative  to  the  arithmetic  average  of  the  twelve 
monthly indices of  the previous period  1. The reference 
value  is  calculated  as  the  arithmetic  average of the 
inflation rates  of the three best performing Member 
States plus 1.5 percentage points. 
Over the  period  for  which a  reference  value can be 
calculated2,  the  reference  value  declined  marginally 
from  2.7%  in  December 1995  to  2.6%  in 
September 1996  (see  Table 3.1).  Over  the  period 
concerned, the composition of the reference group of 
the  three  best  performers  shows  little  change.  The 
Netherlands and Finland have invariably been part of 
the group whereas Germany replaced Belgium as from 
June 1996. 
In September 1996, ten Member States had an average 
inflation  rate  below  the  reference  value  (Belgium, 
Denmark,  Germany,  France;  Ireland3,  Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Sweden), while 
in  two  other  countries  (Portugal  and  the 
United Kingdom),  the  average  inflation.  rate  was 
0.4 percentage  points  above  the  reference  value.  Iri 
Spain and Italy, the average inflation rate exceeded the 
reference  value  by  1.2 percentage  points  and 
2.1  percentage  points,  respectively.  In  the  case  of 
Greece, the gap from. the reference value amounted to 
5.8 percentage points (see Table 3.2) 
It  should be noted that this measure is different from that usually referred to as the inflation rate (calculated 
as the percentage change in an index in the latest month over the index of 12 months before), which has 
been used in Section 3.2.1. and Graph 3.1. 
2 
3 
1l1e time series for the IICP are available only from January 1994. As a result, the earliest reference value 
which can be calculated is for' December 1995. 
For Ireland the IICP and national CPI are only available quarterly. Table 3.2 
The avera~e rate of inflation 
(measured by IICP; percentage change) 
Interim indices of consumer 
_11riccs 
December  September 
1995(l)  1996(l) 
B  1.4  l.G 
DK  2.3  2.2 
D  1.5  1.3 
EL  9.0  8.4 
E  4.7  3.8 
F  1.7  2.1 
IRL (2)  2.4  2.1 
I  5.4  4.7 
L  1.9  1.3 
NL  l.l  1.2 
A  2.0  1.7 
r  3.8  3.0 
FIN  1.0  0.9 
s  2.9  l.G 
UK  3.1  3.0 
EUR  3.0  2.7 
(1) Measured by the percentage change in the 
arithmetic average of  twelve monthly indices 
relative to  the arithmetic average of  the 
twelve monthly indices of  the previous 
period. 
(2) Measured on the basis of  quarterly data 
Source: Commission services  . 
23 
The  convergence  situation  was  better  in 
September 1996 than in  December 1995, when nine 
countries  enjoyed  average inflation  rates  below the 
reference  value,  and  when  the  distance  from  the 
reference  value  in  the  other  countries  was  larger 
than is currently the case. 
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3.3 Inflation performance during the second stage of EMU 
The  limited  time-span  covered  by  the  IICPs  does . not  allow  more  recent  inflation 
developments to be seen in perspective. To ensure a comprehensive and balanced examination 
of  the degree of  price stability and the sustainability of the inflation performance, some other 
inflation indicators must be considered,  including private consumption deflators  and CPis.  .  . 
The box on the "Differences between II CPs and CPis" examines the scale of  such differences. 
Developments with regard to private consumption deflators and CPis confirm that substantial 
progress i~ inflation convergence has been achieved in the Community since the start of  Stage 
Two of EMU on 1 January 1994. Between 1993 and 1995, inflation for the Conimunity as a 
whole, fell from 4% to 3%, as measured by the private consumption deflator, and from  3~% 
to 3%, as measured by the CPl. This downward trend has continued in 1996, with inflation in 
the Community on  av~rage expected to  be just over 2Y2%  on both measures this  year (sec 
Table 3.3). 
At the country level, the picture painted by the evolution of  the private consumption deflator 
and the CPI is similar to that outlined by the llCPs. The decline in inflation is observed in all 
the Community countries, although to  varying degrees. During Stage Two, Member States 
which have long participated in the exchange-rate mechanism (ERM) (Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) have consolidated their already 
good initial inflation performances, while the three new Member States (Austria, Finland and 
Sweden) have converged in terms of  price stability towards this first group. 
In the United Kingdom, the CPI evolution is strongly influenced by movements in mortgage 
rates. The latter largely explains the drop to  1.6% i_n  1993 and the subsequent rise to 3.5% up 
to  1995. Again, most of  the slowdown in the CPI inflation during the first half of 1996 is due 
to the fall in mortgage rates. However, the private consumption deflator showed an casing in 
inflation from 3.5% in 1993 to 2.6% in 1995, and it is expected to be slightly lower in 1996. 25 
Table 3.3 
Private consumption deflator and consumer price index 
(national currency, percentage change) 
Private consumption  Consumer price index 
deflator 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1993  1994  1995  Sep.96 
(I)  (2) 
B  3.0  3.2  1.6  2.0  2.8  2.4  1.5  1.8 
DK  0.3  1.7  2.1  2.0  1.3  2.0  2.1  2.0 
D  3.9  2.7  2.0  1.8  3.6  2.7  1.8  1.6 
EL  13.7  10.8  9.3  8.5  14.4  10.9  9.3  8.6 
E  5.5  4.9  4.7  3.6  4.6  4.7  4.7  3.8 
F  2.2  2.1  1.7  1.9  2.1  1.7  1.8  2.1 
IRL  1.9  2.6  2.0  2.0  1.4  2.3  2.6  1.8 
I  5.4  4.6  5.8  3.9  4.5  4.0  5.2  4.6 
L  7.0  2.4  2.0  1.7  3.6  2.2  1.9  1.3 
NL  2.1  2.7  0.9  1.9  2.6  2.8  1.9  1.9 
A  3.4  3.0  2.3  2.0  3.6  3.0  2.2  1.8 
p  7.1  4.8  4.2  3.3  6.4  5.2  4.1  3.3 
FIN  4.2  1.4  0.2  0.9  2.2  1.1  1.0  0.5 
s  5.7  3.1  2.7  1.7  4.6  2.2  2.5  1.2 
UK  3.5  2.5  2.6  2.5  1.6  2.5  3.4  2.6 
EUR  4.1  3.3  3.0  2.6  3.4  3.1  3.1  2.7 
CV  0.73  0.63  0.75  0.66  0.85  0.68  0.66  0.74 
CVER11  0.62  0.35  0.48  0.34  0.49  0.40  0.41  0.43 
CV 
Non-ERM  0.59  0.59  0.76  0.63  0.81  0.63  0.67  0.66 
(1) Autumn 1996 economic forecasts. 
(2) Measured by the percentage change in the arithmetic avernge of 
twelve monthly indices rclative to arithmetic average of  the twelve 
monthly indices of  the previous period. 
CV =  Coefficient of  variation (ratio of  the standard deviation to the mean 
of  the data). 
CV  ERMis the coefficient of  variation for; B, DK, D, E, F, IRL, L, NL, 
P for 1993 and 1994. A is included in 1995 and 1996. FIN is included in 
1996. 
TI1e Non-ERM includes EL, I, UK for 1993 and 1994. FIN and S are 
included in the CV Non-ERM for 1995 and S also for  I 996. 
Source: Commission services. 
In  the  remaining  Member 
States  (Spain,  Greece,  Italy 
and  Portugal),  a  clear 
improvement  has  been 
observed  since  1993,  but  in 
Spain  and  Portugal  the 
downward  trend  in  inflation 
was interrupted  in  the  spnng 
of 1996. 
The  generalised  reduction  in 
inflation  throughout  the 
Community  has  been 
accompanied  by  a . narrowing 
in  inflation  differentials 
between Member States.  One 
indication of how inflation in 
the Member States has tended 
to converge is provided by the 
coefficient  of variation4  ,  a 
statistical  measure  of 
. dispersion.  The coefficient of 
variation  for  inflation, 
measured  by  the  private 
consumption  deflator, 
declined from 0.73  in 1993  to 
0.66  m  1996  for  the 
Community  as a  whole.  The 
convergence process has been 
even greater within the ERM 
group, with the coefficient of 
variation  declining  from  0.62 
in  1993  to  0.34 in  1996.  On 
the  other  hand,  substantially 
greater variability continues to 
characterise  inflation  within 
the non-ERM group. 
4  The coefficient ofvariation shows the dispersion ofindividua1 Member State's inflation around the average 
rate of inflation for each year; the higher the value, the greater the dispersion of  inflation in any given year. 26 
3.4 The sustainability of price convergence 
The process of  inflation convergence which has been evident in the Community for more than 
a decade results in large part from fundamental changes in the attitude of all economic actors 
towards  inflation. 
The most important structural change has undoubtedly been the determined implementation of 
monetary policies targeted at price stability.  Several Member States have adopted explicit 
inflation targets, or indirect objectives (like a money growth target or an exchange rate target), 
and accordingly they have conducted their monetary policies credibly. 
Institutional changes such as the prohibition of central bank financing of  budget deficits and 
the prohibition of  privileged access of  the public sector to financial institutions (which entered 
into  force  with the  start of Stage Two)  as  well as  the granting of independence to  central 
banks  (as  required by the Treaty by the end of Stage Two,  see  Chapter 2)  have helped  to 
strengthen  the  effectiveness  and  credibility of a  stability-oriented  monetary  policy  in  the 
Member States. 
Besides its direct effect on inflation," monetary policy also exerts a curbing impact on price 
increases through its influence on economic agents' behaviour. By remaining firm on an anti-
inflation policy, monetary authorities  raise the credibility of price stability objectives  and 
strongly  contribute  to . reduce  inflation  expectations.  Nominal  wage  moderation  has  been 
progressively achieved over the past !en years (see section 7.4.1). This trend suggests that the 
Social  Partners  have  increasingly  internalised  the  price-stability  objective  in  their  wage 
settlements. 
But other key structural factors have contributed importantly to the low inflation environment 
currently prevailing in the Community. The completion of  the .single market has exerted - and 
will continue to do so - dowriward pressure on price inflation at the firm and sectoral level 
mainly through two  channels.· Firstly,  the removal of national trade  barriers has increased 
competition .in many markets  for goods  and services, with  a subsequent  squeeze of rents 
which  resulted  from  imperfect  market  situations.  Secondly,  greater  competition  has  also 
induced  a  more  efficient  allocation  of resources  within  the  Community,  fostering  the 
efficiency  of the  supply  side.  Production  costs  h·ave  thus  been  curbed,  with  an  obvious 
downward impact on prices. 
Since the  1980s, most Member States have re-oriented their  budgetary policy. The use of 
discretionary budgetary instruments for regulating economic activity has been increasingly 
regarded  as  inefficient  and  even  damaging,  as  persistent  excessive  deficits  and  the 
accumulation  of public  debt  have  been  accompanied  by serious  adverse  supply-side  and 
inflation effects. Initially, the success of budgetary consolidation policies was mixed, but, in 
recent years, efforts to reduce budget deficits have intensified and  have proved to be more 
credible, as examined in Chapter 4. The shift towards greater budgetary discipline, aimed at 
balanced positions in the medium term, has foste~ed low and stable inflationary expectations, 
thereby facilitating the task of monetary policy to  a·chieve and maintain price stability with· 
lower interest rates.  · 27 
Beside structural factors, cyclical forces have also helped to bring about the current favourable 
inflation performance in the Community.  The persistence of  output levels below full capacity 
has exerted a strong disincentive for companies to  raise prices or to  allow significant wage 
mcreases. 28 
CALCULATION OF THE INFLATION REFERENCE VALUE 
Protocol No 6 states that the inflation reference value should be calculated on the basis of "an 
average rate  of inflation,  observed over a period of one year of,  at most,  the  three  best 
performing States". 
As to the question of  the average, in this report preference is given to an arithmetic average as 
opposed to a  geometric  one as  it  is  the  most  commonly  used  method.  Furthermore,  the 
difference between the arithmetic and geometric average is very small,  especially if  inflation is 
low. 
Regarding the period of one year, two main approaches are possible: either using the year-on-
year change of a monthly indicator (for instance,  September I 996/September I 995), or using 
the  average  change  of the  last  twelve  months  over  the  preceding  twelve  months.  The 
advantage  of the  first  approach  is  that it  is  straightforward  and  easy  understandable.  But 
disadvantages outweigh this  advantage.  Indeed, results may vary importantly from month to 
month,  because  of possible  base  effects  due  for  instance  to  changes  in  indirect  taxes. 
Furthermore,  and  more importantly,  as  the criterion should  assess  the sustainability of price 
stability  and  of inflation  convergence,  taking  into  account  a  longer  period  seems  more 
appropriate. 
Concerning the number of countries to be included in the calculation of the reference value, 
different  approaches  arc  conceivable.  A  first  group  takes  one  country  to  calculaate  the 
reference value: 
Method 1: the best performing country+ 1.5 percentage points. 
Method 2:  the second best performing country+ 1.5 percentage points. 
Method 3: the third best performing country +  1.5 percentage points. 
A second group of  interpretations would take an average of  two or three countries: 
Method 4:  im  uml'eighted m'erage of the  two  best performing countries  +  1.5 percentage 
points. 
Method 5:  the um1'eighted average of  the  three best pe1jorming countries + 1.5 percentage 
points. 
Method 6:  a  weighted average of the  three  best performing countries  +  1.5 percentage 
points. 29 
Table 3.4 
Inflation com·ergence according to alternath·e methods for the calculation of the reference value, 
ncr 
December 1995 OJ  Scp_tember 1996 (IJ 
Number of  Number of 
Reference  member states  Reference  member states 
\'alue  respecting the  value  respecting the 
reference value  reference value 
(:\)  (3) 
1. 1l1e best perfonning country 
2.5  9  2.4  10  +1.5 percentage points. 
2. TI1e second best performing country 
2.6  9  2.7  10  + 1.5  percentage points.  ' 
3. TI1e third best performing country 
2.9  9  2.8  10  + 1.5 percentage points. 
4. The two best performing countries, 
2.5  9  2.6  10  unwcighted average 
+ 1.5 percentage points. 
5. TI1e three best performing countries,  2.7  9  2.6  10 
unweighted average 
+ 1.5 percentage points. 
6. The three best perfonning countries, 
weighted<
2l average+  1.5 percentage 
2.7  9  2.8  10 
points. 
(1) Measured by the percentage change in the arithmetic average of  twelve monthly indices relative to the 
arithMetic average of  the twelve monthly indices of  the previous period. 
(2) Weighted according to shares of private consumption in 1995 at current prices, PPS. 
(3) 9 countries respecting the reference value in December 1995: B, DK, D, F, IRL, L, NL, A, FIN. 
10 countries respecting the reference value in September 1996: B, DK, D, F, IRL, L, NL, A,. FIN, S. 
Soura: Commission services. 
A reference value has been calculated according to these six methods both for December 1995 
and  for  September 1996.  For  the  purpose  of this  report,  the  Commission  has  adopted 
method 5.  Table 3.4 shows that the number of countries with inflation below the reference 
value is the same, both in December 1995 and in September 1996, whatever the method used. 
These results may be explained by two factors. First, there is an important group of countries 
which has achieved low and convergent inflation in a sustained way.  As a result,  neither the 
number of  countries taken into account nor the composition of  the reference group has a major 
effect on the magnitude of the reference value.  Secondly,  the inflation performance of the 
remaining  Member  Stat.es  is  still  too  distant  from  the low  inflation  group  such that  small 
variations in the reference value do not a
1low these countries to be below the reference value. 30 
DIFFERENCES BETIVEEN IICPS AND CPJS 
The  differences  between  IICPs  and  CPis  depend  very  much  on  the  existing  structure  of 
national CPis. 
For countries where the CPis incorporate items like health care or imputed rents on owner-
occupied housing, the IICPs will tend to be lower than the CPis as  the  prices of these items 
tend to rise faster than those of  internationally traded goods. On the other hand, for countries 
where alcohol and  tobacco prices are excluded from the CPis, the difference with the IICPs 
will be positive as price increases on these goods are typically higher than average. Countries 
where  mortgages  are  included .  in  the  national  CPis  will  sec  erratic  differentials.  At  the 
Community level and for a number of countries, differences between the CPI and the IICP are 
minor, with the discrepancy in the range of  ±0.1  percentage point to ±0.3 percentage point (see 
Table 3.5).  But  for  some  countries,  differences  vary  from  ±
1 12 percentage  point  to  nearly 
1 percentage point (Ireland, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom). 
Table 3.5 
Difference between llCPs and CPis 
(percentage change) 
1995(!)  March 1996(2!  September 1996(2) 
llCP  CPI  Difference  llCP  CPI  Difference  llCP  CPI  Difference 
llCP-CPI  llCP-CPI  llCP-CPI 
B  1.4  1.5  -0.1  1.7  2.0  -0.3  2.1  1.9  0.2 
DK  2.3  2.1  0.2  2.3  2.1  0.2  2.5  2.3  0.2 
D  1.5  1.8  -0.3  1.4  1.7  -0.3  1.3  1.4  -0.1 
EL  9.0  9.3  -0.3  8.9  9.1  -0.2  8.1  8.5  -0.4 
"E  4.7  4.7  0.0  3.4  3.4  0.0  3.6  3.6  0.0 
F  1.7  1.8  -0.1  2.5  2.3  0.2  1.6  1.6  0.0 
lRL (3)  2.4  2.6  -0.2  2.1.  2.0  0.1  2.2  1.4  0.8 
I  5.4  5.2  0.2  4.4  4.5  -0.1  3.5  3.4  0.1 
·L  1.9  1.9  0.0  1.3  1.2  0.1  1.5  1.4  0.1 
NL  1.1  1.9  -0.8  1.5  2.1  -0.6  1.4  2.0  -0.6 
A  2.0  2.2  -0.2  1.8  1.8  0.0  2.2  2.0  0.2 
p  3:8  4.1  -0.3  2.1  2.4  -0.3  3.2  3.4  -0.2 
FIN  1.0  1.0  0.0  1.1  0.6  0.5  1.2  0.6  0.6 
s  2.9  2.5  0.4  1.5  1.5  0.0  0.6  -0.1  0.7 
UK  3.1  3.4  -0.3  3.0  2.7  0.3  2.9  2.1  0.8 
EUR  3.0  3.1  -0.1  2.7  2.7  0.0  2.4  2.3  0.1 
( 1) Annual percentage change. 
(2) Percentage on a year earlier, Tff-12. 
(3) Measured on the basis of  quarterly data. 
Source: Commission services. 31 
Table 3.6 
Inflation com•ergence using IICPs and CPis 
(percentage change) 
Interim indices of  Consumer Price Index 
consumer prices  (I)  (1) 
Three best  Dec.  Sep.  Dec.  Sep. 
perfonners  1995(l)  199G(I)  1995(l)  199G(I) 
B  1.4  - 1.5  -
D  - 1.3  - -
F  - - 1.8  -
NL  1.1  1.2  - -
L  - - - 1.3 
FIN  1.0  0.9  1.0  0.5 
s  - - - 1.2 
Reference  2.7  2.6  2.9  2.5 
valueC2) 
Member States respecting the reference value 
Number:  9  10  10  lO 
Out of:  15  15  15  15 
B  1.4  1.6  1.5  1.8 
DK  2.3  2.2  2.1  2.0 
D  1.5  1.3  1.8  1.6 
F  1.7  2.1  1.8  2.1 
IRL (3)  2.4  2.1  2.6  1.8 
L  1.9  1.3  1.9  1.3 
NL  l.l  1.2  1.9  1.9 
A  2.0  1.7  2.2  1.8 
FIN  1.0  0.9  1.0  0.5 
s  - 1.6  2.5  1.2 
(I) Measured by the percentage change in the aritlunetic average 
of  twelve monthly indices relative to aritlunetic average oftl1e 
t\\•e!ve monthly indices of  the previous period. 
(2)  Definition adapted in this report: aritlunetic average of the 
tlrree best perfonners in tenns of inflation plus 1.5 percentage 
points. 
(3)  Measured on the basis of  quarterly data. 
Source: Conrrnission services. 
Furthermore,  since  the  inflation 
criterion is  defined in  relative and not 
in absolute terms, the use of  the II  CPs 
does  not  significantly  influence  the 
·results.  As indicated in  Table 3.6, the 
number  of  countries  respecting  the 
reference  value  does  not differ  if the 
CPI  is  used  instead  of  the  IICP. 
However,  the group of the three best 
performing countr_ies is different. .32 
4. GOVERNMENT BUDGETARY POSITION 
4.1  Existence of an excessive deficit 
Fulfilment  of the criterion on the  sustainability of the government financial  position 
depends,  as  the  second  indent  of Article 109j(1)  makes  clear,  on a  Member State 
having achieved a government budgetary position without a deficit that is excessive as 
determined  in  accordance with Article 104c(6).  Protocol  No 6  on the  convergence 
criteria further states, in Article 2, that: 
"The criterion on the government budgetary position referred to in the second indent 
of  Article 109}(1)  of this Treaty shall mean that at the  time ofthe examination the 
Member ·State is not the subject of  a Council decision  under Article I 04c(6) of this 
Treaty that an excessive deficit exists". 
The  role  of this  report,  therefore,  is  not  to  make  an  independent  assessment  of 
whether  or  not  Member  States  currently  fulfil  the  criterion  on  the  government 
budgetary  position.  This  is  already  determined  by  the  Council  decisions.  on  the 
existence  of an  excessive  deficit.  The  first  section  of this  chapter .describes  the 
application of  the excessive deficit procedure during the second stage of  EMU and the 
decisions on the existence of an excessive deficit which are currently in force.  In the 
remaining  sections  of this  chapter  recent  budgetary  developments  in  the  Member 
States are reviewed. 
The provisions of  the excessive deficit procedure (Article 1  04c with the exception ·of 
paragraphs 1, 9,  11  and 14, together with the associated Protocol.(No 5)) have applied 
since the begi~ng of the second stage of EMU' in January 1994.  The practice since 
then has  been for the  Commission  and  Council  to implement  the procedure on an 
.annual basis. Each year the various steps of  the procedure have been applied following 
the March reporting  of budgetary data by  Member  States  (as  required  by  Council 
Reglilation (EC) No 3605/93). The box on the "Excessive deficit procedure" describes 
the main features of  the procedure during the second stage. 
In the first  application of the ·procedure in 1994 the Council decided!  in accordance 
with Article 1  04c(  6) on the existence of an excessive deficit in ten of the then twelve 
Member States. Only Ireland and Luxembourg were not the subject of  such a decision: 
in Ireland the government deficit was below the reference value of3% ofGDP and the 
government debt ratio,  while above the reference  value  of 60% of GDP,  had  been 
declining significantiy; in Luxembourg the government balance was in surplus and the 
debt ratio was £1r  below the reference value.  All  the other ten Member States were 
judged not to satisfy one or both of  the criteria for government deficit and debt. 
In 1995 the procedure was applied for the fi~st time to the three new Member States 
(Austria,  Finland  and  Sweden)  and  the  Council  decided2  that  an  excessive  deficit 
2 
Council  decisions  of .26  September  1994.  None  of the  documents  for  the  application  of the 
procedure has been published in the Official Journal. 
Council decisions of 10 July I 995. 33 
existed in each of them.  At the same time the Council decided3  in accordance with 
Article 104c(12)  to  abrogate  the  decision  on  Germany:  the  government  deficit  in 
Germany  had  fallen  below  the  reference  value  in  1994  and  was  expected  then  to 
remain below in  1995,  and  the government debt ratio  remained below the reference 
value. 
In the application ofthe procedure in 1996 the Council adopted a new decision4 on the 
existence of an excessive  deficit in Germany:  as  it  had  turned  out,  the government 
deficit in Germany rose above the reference value in 1995 and was expected to remain 
above in  1996.  The Council also  decided5 to abrogate the decision on Denmark:  the 
government deficit in  Denmark fell  well below the reference value in  1995  and  was 
expected to remain at a low level in 1996, and the government debt ratio, while still 
above the reference value, declined significantly in 1994 and 1995. 
Thus twelve Member States  arc  currently the subject of a  Council  decision that  an 
excessive deficit exists.  At present,  only three Member States (Denmark, Ireland and 
Luxembourg) are not the subject of such a decision and so fulfil  the criterion on the 
government budgetary position. 
4.2 Budgetary developments in 1996 
Efforts at budgetary consolidation in  1996 have been made within the context of a 
pause in  economic growth.  The Commission services  forecast  real  GDP  growth of 




Council decision of 10 July 1995. 
Council decision of  27 June 1996. 
Council decision of 27 June 1996. 34 
average arc expected for Belgium,  Germany,  France,  Italy  and  Austria.  Despite the 
unfavourable  economic  climate  almost  all  Member  States  are  expected  to  make 
further  progress  in  reducing  government  deficits  in  I 996.  According  to  the  latest 
forecasts of  the Commission services (see Table 4. I and Graph 4.1 ),  only Germany is 
likely to sec a widening of  its deficit in I 996. In all the other Member States and in the 
European Union as  a whole the deficit is  expected to decline  (in  Luxembourg,  the 
surplus is likely to be smaller). Particularly large reductions in the deficit of more than 
I% of GDP are likely in  Greece,  Spain,  the Netherlands, Austria,  Portugal,  Finland, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
Table 4.1 
General government deficit 
(% ofGDP) 
1993  1994  1995 
B  7.5  5.1  4.1 
DK  3.9  3.5  1.6 
D  3.5  2.4  3.5 
EL  14.2  12.1  9.1 
E  6.8  6.3  6.6 
F  5.6  5.6  4.8 
IRL  2.4  1.7  2.0 
I  9.6  9.0  7.1 
L (2)  -1.7  -2.6  -1.5 
NL  3.2  3.4  4.0 
A  4.2  4.4  5.9 
p  6.9  5.8  5.1 
FIN  8.0  6.2  5.2 
s  12.3  10.8  8.1 
UK  7.8  6.8  5.8 
EUR  6.2  5.4  5.0 
(1) Autumn 1996 economic forecasts. 
(2) Negative sign indicates a surplus 



















On present estimates, it seems 
likely  that  in  1996  one more 
Member  State  (the 
Netherlands)  will  succeed  in 
reducing  its  deficit  to  below 
the  3%  of  GDP  reference 
value,  thus  joining  the  three 
Member  States  which  have 
already  achieved  this 
- Denmark,  Ireland  and 
Luxembourg  (in  surplus). 
Two Member States (Belgium 
and  Finland)  arc  likely  to 
achieve  a  deficit  of between 
3%  and  3V2%  of GDP  this 
year  and  a  further  stx 
(Germany,  Spain,  France, 
Austria,  Portugal  and 
Sweden) are expected to have 
a deficit below 4Y2% ofGDP. 
Persisting government deficits 
and  relatively  low growth of 
nomi.nal  GDP  (due  to  both 
poor real  growth· and  a  good  or improving  inflation  performance)  imply  that  the 
government gross debt ratio, all other things being equal, is likely to continue rising in 
several Member States in.l996 and in the European Union as  a whole (sec Table 4.2 
and  Graph  4.2).  However,  in  Belgium,  Denmark,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden the debt ratio is expected to decline this year. 35 
Table 4.2 
General government gross debt 
(% ofGDP) 
Level  Change 
1993  1994  1995  1996 (1)  94/93  95/94  96195 
B  137.0  135.0  133.7  130.6  -2.0  -1.3  -3.1 
DK (2)  80.1  76.0  71.9  70.2  -4.1  -4.:.  -1.7 
D (3)  48.2  50.4  58.1  60.8  2.2  7.7  2.7 
EL  111.8  110.4  111.8  110.6  -1.4  1.4  -1.2 
E  60.5  63.1  65.7  67.8  2.6  2.6  2.1 
F  45.6  48.4  52.8  56.4  2.8  4.4  3.6 
IRL  94.5  87.9  81.6  74.7  -6.6  -6.3  -6.9 
I  119.3  125.5  124.9  123.4  6.2  . -0.6  -1.5 
L  6.2  5.7  6.0  7.8  -0.5  oj  . 1.8 
NL  80.8  77.4  79.7  78.7  -3.4  2.3  -1.0 
A  62.8  65.1  69.0  71.7  2.3  3.9  2.7 
p  68.2  69.6  71.7  71.1  1.4  2.1  -0.6 
FIN  57.3  59.5  59.2  61.3  2.2  .;.Q.3  2.1 
s  76.0  79.3  78.7  78.1  3.3  -0.6  -0.6 
UK  48.5  50.4  . 54.1  56.3  1.9  3.7  2.2 
EUR  66.1  68.1  71.3  73.5  2.0  3.2  2.2 
(l)Autunm 1996 economic forecasts. 
(2)  Government deposits with the central bank, government holdings of  non-
governmental bonds and public enterprises related debt amounted to some 
18  percent of  GDP in 1995. 
(3)  TI1e sharp increase in the German debt ratio in 1995 is mainly caused by 
the take-over by the government of  off-budget unification-related 
liabilities, the.most important of  which is the debt of  the 
"Treuhandanstalt". 
Source: Commission services. 
At the  end  of 1996 
the  debt  ratio  is 
expected  by  the 
Commission 
services to be below 
the  60%  of  GDP 
reference  value  in 
three  ~ember 
States  France, 
Luxembourg  and 
the.  United 
Kingdor:1.·  The  debt 
ratio is  hkely to rise 
to  just  above  the 
60%  level  m 
Germany  and 
Finland and to be in 
· the  range  between 
60 and 70% of  GDP 
also  in  Spain.  In 
Denmark,  Ireland, 
the  Netherlands, 
Austria,  Portugal 
and  Sweden  the 
debt  ratio  is  likely 
to  be  in  the  range 
between  70  and 
80%  of  GDP; 
Finally,  m  three 
~ember  States 
(Belgium, Greece and Italy) the debt ratio will remain higher than 110% ofGDP·. 3G 
4.3 Progress with budgetary consolidation during the second stage of EMU 
At the beginning of the second stage of EMU budgetary positions in  most Member 
States were in very serious imbalance; deficits had risen in many cases to record levels 
in  1993  as a result of the· sharp recession and debt ratios were on an upward trend in 
all Member States except lreland.and Luxembourg. 
During  the  last  three  years  efforts  by  Member  S~ate  governments  at  budgetary 
consolidation have been intensified on a broad front.  There has been a rising awareness 
of the  risks  for  inflation,  interest  rates  and  economic  growth  from  uncorrected 
budgetary imbalances generating debt trends which are very difficult to reverse. During 
this  period financial  markets have tended  more clearly  to attach a  risk  premium to 
countries with untackled budgetary problems. In addition, policy in the Member States 
has  drawn support from  the  need  for  a  high  degree of convergence in  view of the 
single currency. 
All  the Member States with high levels  of deficits .have adopted ambitious  medium-
term programmes for budgetary consolidation.  Reducing  budgetary imbalances  is  at 
the core of the convergence programmes presented by Member States at Community 
level. 
Although in several  cases progress has  not  been  as  rapid  as  originally  planned  and 
there have been a few setbacks, the experience since 1993 in most Member States has 
been one of steady narrowing of government deficits (see Table 4.1  and Graph 4.3). 
The only exceptions arc Germany, where after the deficit declined in 1994 it has risen 
again  in  both  1995  and  1996,  Spain,  wher~ the  deficit  increased  in  1995  before 
declining again in 1996, the Netherlands, where the deficit widened in 1994 and  1995 
before declining in  1996,  and  Austria, which also  saw its  deficit  continue to  rise  in 
1994 and 1995 before a reduction in 1996. The surplus in Luxembourg has fluctuated 
from year to year. 
EspeCially large deficit reductions of over 4% of GDP  have been achieved  between 
1993 and 1996 in Belgium, Greece, Finland and Sweden, while reductions of between 
2% and 4% of  GDP have been seen in Denmark, Spain, Italy, Portugal and the United 
Kingdom.  Nonetheless  many  of these countries  started  from  very  high  deficits  and 
have not yet  reach~d satisfactory deficit levels.  Although the short-term focus  is  on 
bringing deficits down to 3% of GDP, this has to be seen as  only a step on the way 
towards re-establishing sound budgetary positions. As shown by the recent discussions 
about  a  stability  pact  on  which  proposals  were  adopted  by  the  Commission  on 
16 October 1996, the 3% of GDP deficit reference value is  to be considered not as  a 
target but as a ceiling; it would be appropriate for Member States to aim in the medium 
term for budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus so as tu foster growth and 
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4. 3.1 Influence of  the economic cycle 
Just  as  deficits  in  1993  were  swollen  by  the  impact  of recession,  so  part  of the 
improvement in deficits since then can be ascribed to the effects on spending and tax 
revenues of  the recovery in economic activity. In 1994 and  1995 more than half of  the 
.·• 
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...................................... ·-··  ..-" 
deficit  reduction in the EU as  a whole  can be ascribed  to these cyclical  influences, 
according to the prudent cyclical adjustment method used by the Commission services 
(see Tabl~ 4.3 and Graph 4.4). Between mid-1995 and mid-1996 there was a pause in 
growth which has  generally  depressed  GDP  growth rates  for  1996  and  in  several 
countries has had an adverse impact on budget balances. According to latest estimates, 
while for the EU as a whole a reduction of 0.6% of GDP in the government deficit is 
expected in 1996, cyclical influences have had a negative impact on this figure of0.2% 
ofGDP, and the decline in the cyclically adjusted deficit is estimated at 0.8% ofGDP. 39 
Table 4.3  Table 4.4 
Ch~nges from previous year in the actual and 
cyclically adjusted general government deficit 
(% ofGDP) 
Cyclical adjustment of government deficit in 
1996 
(% ofGDP) 
Change in deficit 
Change in cyclically-
ad"usted deficit 
1994  1995  1996  1994  1995  1996 
Go\'cnuucnt  Cyclical  Cyclically 
deficit  component  adjusted 
tlcfidt 
B  -2.3  -1.0  -0.8  -2.0  -1.0  -1.0  B  3.3  0.6  2.7 
DK  -0.4  -1.8  -0.2  1.1  -1.3  -0.3  DK  1.4  0.2  1.2 
D  -1.0  1.1  0.5  -0.8  0.9  0.0  D  4.0  0.5  3.5 
EL  -2.1  -3.0  -1.2  -2.2  -2.9  -0.9  EL  7.9  0.4  7.5 
E  -0.4  0.3  -2.2  -0.6  0.6  -2.3  E  4.4  0.9  3.5 
F  0.0  -0.8  -0.8  0.5  -0.6  -1.2  F  4.0  0.6  3.4 
IRL  -0.7  0.3  -0.4  0.1  2.8  0.4  1RL  1.6  -2.0  3.6 
I  -0.5  -1.9  -0.5  -0.2  -1.2  ~0.9  I  6.6  0.4  6.2 
L (!)  -1.0  1.1  0.6  n.a.  1.5  0.3  L  -0.9  0.4  -1.3 
NL  0.2  0.7  -1.4  0.7  0.4  -1.4  NL  2.6  0.3  2.3 
A  0.2  1.5  -1.6  0.7  1.2  -2.0  A  4.3  0.2  4.1 
p  -1.1  -0.7  -1.1  -1.7  -0.7  -1.0  p  4.0  0.8  3.2 
FIN  -1.8  -1.0  -1.9  0.1  1.0  -1.7.  FIN  3.3  1.1  2.2 
s  -1.5  -2.7  -4.1  -0.4  -1.3  -3.8  s  3.9  0.9  3.0 
UK  -1.0  -1.0  -1.1  -0.1  -0.7  -1.1  UK  4.6  0.6  4.0 
EUR  -0.7  -0.4  -0.6  -0.2  -0.2  -0.8  EUR  4.4  0.5  3.9 
A negati\'e (positive) sign indicates a reduction  Source: Commission services, Autumn 1996 
(increase) in the deficit;  economic forecasts. 
(1) Luxembourg l1as a surplus, thus a negative (positive) 
sign indicates an increase (a reduction) in its surplus. 
Sourer: Commission services; figures for 1996 from 
Autumn 1996 economic forecasts. 
Because ofthc recession in the early 1990s and the hesitant recovery since then, levels 
of GDP  in  1996  still  remain .below their trend in  all Member States  except Ireland. 
Such a negative output gap implies  that the deficit  adjusted for cyclical influences. is 
not  as  high  as  the  recorded  deficit.  Using  the  cyclical  adjustment  method  of the 
Commission services, three Member States (Belgium, Finland and Sweden) which arc 
likely  to record deficits  over 3% of GDP  this year arc  estimated to  have  cyclically 
adjusted deficits equal to or below 3% ofGDP (sec Table 4.4).6 
6  This method is,  however,  rather prudent:  according to  figures  from the IMF published in the 
World Economic Outlook of October 1996 for instance, of the Member States with deficits over 
3% of GDP this year, the structural deficit was estimated to be below or equ:1l to 3% in Belgium,· 
Germany, Sp.1in, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. 40 
4.3.2 Trends in the debt ratio 
Although there has been widespread progress in reducingbudget deficits, this has only 
been sufficient in a few cases to clearly reverse the upward trend in the debt ratio (see 
Table 4.2 and Grap_h 4.3). In B 
Table 4.5 
Factors, other than the deficit, 
adding to the d~bt stock 
(stock/f1ow adjustment) 
(% ofGDP) 
1989-93  1994-96 
annual  annual 
average  avt.'rage 
B  1.0  -1.4 
DK  3.7  -2.0 
D  2.1  2.9 
EL  8.1  1.7 
E  2.8  0.6 
F  0.9  0.5 
IRL  1.7  -0.3 
I  1.8  1.3 
L  2.5  2.6 
NL  0.1  -0.1 
A  1.4  0.8 
p  3.4  0.6 
FIN'  7.6  -0.5 
s  5.1  -2.9 
UK  -0.4  -0.6 
EUR  0.9  0.6 
elgium the debt ratio has fallen each year from the very 
high level of 137.0% of GDP reached in 1993 and is 
expected to decline to  130.6% in  1996.  In Denmark, 
similarly,  the ratio peaked at 80.1% of GDP in  1993 
and  is  likely  to  be  at  70.2%  in  1996.  The  earlier 
decline in the debt ratio in Ireland has continued since 
1993,  from  94.5%  of GDP  in  that  year  to  an 
estimated 74.7% in 1996. 
In Greece the debt ratio expected in  1996 at 110.6% 
of GDP  is below its level in  1993.  In the Netherlands 
the debt ratio in 1996 is also expected to be below its 
level of 1993. 
Elsewhere debt ratios have risen significantly over the 
last three years; by at least 5% of GDP in Germany, 
Spain,  France,  Austria  and  the  United Kingdom.  In 
Italy,  after  a  sharp  rise  in  1994  the  debt  ratio  fell 
marginally in  1995  and is  expected to do  so .again in 
1996.  A decline in the debt ratio is  also_ expected in 
Portugal in 1996.  In Finland,  after a small decline in 
1995, the debt ratio is likely to rise again this year. In 
Sweden the debt ratio will  have fallen in  both 1995 
and 1996 but remains above the level in 1993 
Source: Commission services. 
The change in the absolute  level of the government 
gross debt is,  according to Treaty definitions,  affected not only by the borrowing to 
finance the government deficit each year,  but also by a variety of other factors which 
are  reflected  in  the liabilities  in  the  government  balance  sheet.  Thus,  the value  in 
national  currency of debt  denominated  in  foreign  currency  may  change  because of 
exchange rate movements; liabilities may be added to in order to finance on-lending to 
other sectors of the economy; the proceeds of privatisation sales or the running down 
of stocks of  financial assets may be used to reduce the level of  gross debt, etc. In most 
Member States these factors taken together have in the past tended to add regularly to 
the level  of the  debt  stock.  Indeed,  in  the  period  1989-93,  they  added  more than 
2 percentage points of GDP per year on average to the level of the debt stock in eight 
Member States and had an 1ppreciable upward effect in all but the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom (see Table 4.5).  On average in the three years  1994-96 the annual 
impact  on the  debt stock has  been  reduced  compared with the  previous  period  in 
almost all  Member States, with the notable exception of Ger :nany where there have 
been large unification-related debt assumptions.  Indeed the average annual effect has 
been  negative  (i.e.  reducing  the  debt  stock)  in  seven Member  States  in  this  recent 
period and has only exceeded a positive effect of 1% of GDP per year in four Member 
States. There are a number of  explanations for this change, including reduced exchange 
rate turbulence after 1993  and  less  need for the emergency financing of banking and 41 
other sectors which had occurred in several countries: However, there is also evidence 
that, since the gross debt ratio has become more closely monitored during the second 
stage, governments have been managing their balance sheets more carefully. 
4.3.3 The sources of  budgetary adjustment 
For the European Union as a whole the reduction in the government deficit of 1.8% of 
GDP between 1993  and  1996 has been achieved through a reduction in the share in 
GDP of non-interest government expenditure. Between these two years the shares of. 
current  revenues  and  of int<:_rest  payments  have  remained  almost  unchanged  (sec 
Table 4.6). 
Table.4.6 
Revenue and expenditure shares, 1993 and 1996 
(% ofGDP) 
Current revenues  Non-interest expenditure  Interest payments 
1993  1996 (1)  Change  1993  1996 (1)  Change  1993  1996 (1)  Change 
96/93  96/93  96193 
B  49.2  50.5  +1.3  45.9  45.3  -0.6  10.8  8.5  -2.3 
DK  58.3  58.8  +0.5  54.5  53.8  -0.7  7.8  6.4  -1.4 
D  46.4  45.7  -0.7'  46.6  45.9  -0.7  3.3  3.8  +0.5 
EL  34.4  38.0  +3.6  35.7  34.1  -1.6  12.8  11.9  -0.9 
E  42.8  40.3  -2.5  44.4  39.4  -5.0  5.2  5.4  +0.2 
F  49.5  50.6  +1.1  51.7  50.9  -0.8  3.4  3.8  +0.4 
IRL  37.8  34.7  -3.1  33.8  31.8  -2.0  6.5  4.5  -2.0 
I  47.4  46.3- -1.1  44.9  42.4  -2.5  12.1  10.5  -1.6 
I  -L  44.7  41.7  -3.0  42.5  40.4  -2.1  0.4  0.3  -0.1 
NL  52.9  48.3  -4.6  49.9  45.3  -4.6  6.2  5.6  -0.6 
A  49.4  48.2  -1.2  49.4  48.0  -1.4  4.3  4.5  +0.2 
p  37.7  4L'i  +3.8  38.1  41_.0  +2.9  6.8  4.9  -1.9 
FIN  53.8  55.3  . 
+1.5  57.2  52.8  -4.4  4.6  5.9  +1.3 
s  60.3  63.0  +2:7  66.4  59.4  -7.0  6.2  7.5  +1.3 
UK  35.9  37.7  +1.8  40.8  3K6  :.2.2  2.9  3.8  +0.9 
EUR  46.2  46.2  +0.0  47.1  45.2  -1.9  5.4  5.4  +0.0 
( 1) Autumn 1996 economic forecasts. 
Source: Commission set vi~s  .. 
-
The pattern at the level of individual Member States is  more varied.  Most Member 
States have benefited from  lower interest rates.  Those Member States with steadily 
declining  debt  ratios  have  enjoyed  a  marked  decline  in  their  interest  payments 
(Belgium, .Denmark, Ireland) and some others have benefited from declining nominal 
interest rates to an extent that has also cut their interest payments (Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands and  Portugal).  In most of the remaining Member States the rising  debt 
ratio has outweighed any favourable impact from lower nominal interest rates ru:d  the 
Sltare of  interest payments has risen - particularly sharply in Finland and Sweden. 
Non-interest government expenditure has been reduced as a  share of GDP between 
1993 and 1996 in all Member States except Portugal. Especially large declines of  more 
than 4% of  GDP have been achieved in Spain, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden. 42 
Several  of the  Member  States  have  increased  taxation  to  achieve  part  of their 
budgetary adjustment.  The share ir.  GDP of current government revenues  has risen 
between  1993  and  1996  in  Belgium,  Denmark,  Greece,  France,  Portugal,  Finland, 
Sweden and  the United Kingdom.  Elsewhere this  share has  declined;there have been 
particularly  sharp  declines  in  this  revenue  ratio  in  Ireland,  Luxembourg  and  the 
Netherlands  .. 
In  most Member States, however,  the major part of budgetmy adjustment has  come 
from a reduction in the total expenditure ratio. Some Member States have used part or 
almo<::t  all of  the reduction in expenditure to finance lower taxation. By contrast, other· 
Member  States have supplemented  their  expenditure-cutting  efforts  by  also  raising 
taxation. The reduction in the deficit between 1993 and  1996 achieved through higher 
revenues  has  been  at  least  as  important  as  the  reduction  due  to  a  lower  total 
expenditure ratio in Greece, France and the United Kingdom. Portugal stands out from 
the  other Member States  during  this  period,  in  that it  has  used  a  sharp  rise  in  tax 
revenues,  albeit  starting  from  a  relatively  low  level,  to  finance  both  a  rise  in  the 
expenditure ratio and deficit reduction. 
4.3.4. Deficits and  fixed investment 
In its monitoring of budgetary developments for the excessive  deficit  procedure the 
c  11  r  . h  he government deficit and debt  ommtsston, as we  as exammmg come tance w1t  t 
Table 4.7 
Government investment and deficit 
(% ofGDP) 
Government fixed  Government deficit 
investment 
1995  1996  1995  1996  (I) 
B  1.3  1.2  4.1  3.3 
DK  2.0  2.0  1.6  1.4 
D  2.5  2.3  3.5  4.0 
EL  2.9  2S  9.1  7.9 
E  3.6  3.2  6.6  4.4 
F  3.0  3.1  4.8  4.0 
ffiL  2.3  2.3  2.0  1.6 
I  2.3  n.a.  7.I  6.6 
L (2)  4.6  4.8  -1.5  ..0.9 
NL  2.7  2.7  4.0  2.6 
A  3.1  3.1  5.9  4.3 
p  4.0  4.3  5.1  4.0 
FIN  2.7  2.7  5.2  3.3 
s  3.3  3.2  8.1  3.9 
UK  1.8  1.5  5.8  4.6 
EUR  2.6  - 2.5 (3)  5.0  4.4 
(1) Autumn 1996 economic forecasts. 
(2) Negative figure indicates a surplus. 
(3) Excluding Italy 
Sourer: Commission services: 
I 
criteria, ·has also to take into 
accmmt  whether  the 
government  deficit  exceeds 
government  investment 
expenditure.  Table 4.7 shows 
figures for gross fixed  capitai 
formation  by  ge~eral 
·.government in 1995 and latest 
estimates for  1996 in  each of 
the  Member  States  and 
compares  these  with  the 
corresponding  government 
deficits.  · 
In  those  Member  States 
where the government deficit 
remains  above  the  3%  of 
GDP  reference  value,  the 
deficit  is  larger  than 
government  expenditure  on 
fixed  investment  (with  the 
exception  of  Portugal  m 
1996).  Apart  from  the 
Member  States  already  with 
low  deficits  (Denmark, 
Ireland  and  Luxembourg), 43 
current government expenditure elsewhere is in part being financed through borrowing 
(i.e. government saving in most Member States is negative). 
4.4 Sustninability of budgetary convergence 
Budgetary consolidation efforts have been strengthened  duting the course of 1996. 
Most Member States, including all of  those with deficits currently still above the 3% of 
GDP  reference  value,  are aiming  for  a  further  reduction  in  their  deficits  in  1997. 
Table 4.8  Budget plans presented so far during the 
autumn of 1996 have made clearer how 
Objectives for the general government 
deficit in 1997 
(%ofGDP) 
B  2.9  - DK  0.6 
D  2.5 
EL  4.2 
E  3.0 
F  3.0 
IRL  <3 
I  3.0 
L  n.a. 
NL  2.2 
A  3.0 
p  2.9 
FIN  1.4 
s  2.6 
UK<ll  3 
( 1) Financial year 1997/98. 
Source:  National convergence programmes or 
more recent budget statements. 
governments intend to achieve this.Table 
4.8 shows the objectives for the general 
government  deficit  in  19,97  announced 
by  Member  State governments  in their 
latest  convergence  programmes  or  m 
more recent budget statements. 
Several  Member  States  expect  to  be 
clearly  below  the  3%  level  in  1997. 
Another group is aiming at a deficit next 
year  in  line  with  the  reference  value. 
Only Greece is targeting a deficit in 1997 
higher than  3% of GDP;  in  its  revised 
convergence programme Greece set the 
objective  of bringing  the  deficit  below 
the reference value in 1998. 
Beyond  1997  many Member States are 
already  aiming  for further reductions in 
their budget deficits,  often with balance 
or  surplus  as  a  medium-term  goal. 
Achieving sound and sustainable budgetary positions, leading to declining debt ratios 
where they arc too. high,  is .an  essential  condition for  maintaining  stability,  keeping 
interest  rates  low  and  fostering  the  growth  of  output  and  employment.  The 
Commission's proposals for a  stability pact involve a firm  implementation of Treaty 
provisions so as to ensure budgetary discipline in the third stage. 44 
EXCESSIVE DEFICIT PROCEDURE. 
The excessive deficit pro~edure set out in Article 104c ofthe Treaty and the associated 
Protocol No 5 determines the steps to be followed to reach a decision by the Council 
that an excessive deficit exists. 
The  Commission  is  required  (in  paragraph  2  of Article  1  04c)  to  monitor  the 
development of the budgetary situation and  of the stock of government  debt  in the 
Member States with a view to identifying gross errors. In particular, compliance with 
budgetary discipline is to be examined by the Commission on the basis of  the following 
two criteria: 
"(a)  whether  the  ratio  of the  planned  or  actual  government  deficit  to  gross 
domestic product exceeds a reference value (specified in the Protocol as 3%), 
unless:  · 
- either the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached a 
level that comes close to the reference value; 
- or,  alternatively,  the excess of  the reference value is only exceptional and 
temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value; 
(b)  whether the  ratio of  government debt  to  gross domestic product exceeds a 
reference  value  (specified  in  the  Protocol  as  60%),  unless  the  ratio  is 
sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory 
pace." · 
The Commission is required to prepare a report if a Member State does not fulfil the 
requirements  under one  or bo.th  of these  criteria.  The  report  shall  also  take  into 
account whether the government deficit exceeds government investment· expenditure 
and  all  other relevant factors,  including  the ·medium-term  economic and  budgetary· 
position of  the Member State (paragraph 3). 
Subsequent steps in the procedure include the formulation by the Monetary Committee 
of an opinion on the report of the Commission (paragraph 4);  the addressing of an 
opinion to the  Council by the· Commission,  if it  considers  that an excessive  deficit 
exists (paragraph 5); and then a decision by  the Council after an  overall assessment 
whether an  excessive  deficit  exists  (paragraph  6).  Finally,  the  Council  makes  non-
public recommendations to the Member State for "Which the existence of an excessive 
deficit has been decided with a view to bringing that situation to an end within a given 
period  (paragraph  7).  The  Council  may  subsequently. make . its  recommendations 
public,  where it  establishes that there has  been no  effective action in  response to its 
recommendations within the period laid down (paragraph 8). When, in the view of the 
Council, the excessive deficit in the Member States concerned has been corrected, the 
Council  abrogates  its  decision  (paragraph  12).  The  provisions  of Article 104c  m 
paragraphs 9 and 1:  ~e  not applicable during the second stage of  EMU 45 
5. EXCHANGE RATES 
5.1 Treaty provisions 
The exchange rate criterion, as set out in the third indent of  Article 109j(I) of  the Treaty, 
is  defined  as  "the  observance  of the  normal fluctuation  margins providedfor by the 
exchange-rate  mechanism  of the  European. Monetary  System for at least  two  years, 
without devaluing against the currency of  any other Member State".  The fourth indent of 
the same Article refers to  "the durability of  convergence achieved by the Member State 
and of its participation  in  the  exchange-rate  mechanism  of the  European  Monetary 
System being reflected in the long-term interest-rate levels".  In addition, Article 3 of the 
Protocol (No 6) on the convergence criteria specifies that:  "The criterion on participation 
in  the  exchange-rate mechanism of the  European Monetary System  referred to  in  the 
third  indent  of Artic/e )09){1)  of this  Treaty  shall  mean  that  a  A1ember  State  has 
respected the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the  exchange-rate mechanism 
of  the European Monetmy System without severe tensions for at least the last two years 
before  the  examination.  In  particular,  the  Member  State  shall not have  devalued its 
currency's bilateral central rate against any other Member State's currency on its own 
initiative for the same period". 
Eleven currencies are currently pc.rticipating in the ERM. The Austrian schilling joined the 
ERM at the beginr.ing of 1995  and has continued to trade in its traditional, very narrow 
range against the DM.  The Finnish markka joined the ERM on 14 October 1996.  The 
drachma  and  the  Swedish  krona  have  remained  outside  the  ERM,  while  the  lira  and 
sterling have not re-joined since leaving the mechanism in September 1992. 
----------~------~--- --------------~4------------------- ,  I 
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In  the  first  half of 1995,  exchange  rate  tensions  emerged  at  the  international  level, 
reflecting mainly the financial crisis in Mexico and US-Japan trade tensions; these caused a 
pronounced weakening of the US dollar which, combined with country-specific problems 
in Europe, contributed to a strengthening of  the DM against many of  the ERM currencies 
and  to  the increase in the volatility of these currencies.  As  a result,  tensions  emerged 
within the ERM that led to a realignment on 6 March 1995:  at the request of the Spanish 
authorities,  the  Ministers  and  Central  Bank Governors  decided  the  devaluation  of the 
peseta by 7%; by the same decision, the escudo was devalued by 3.5%. 
Tensions in the ERM are reflected in  the spread between the strongest and  the weakest 
currencies in the mechanism, as shown in Graph 5.1. The spread widened to about 12% in 
February 1995. As international financial markets stabilised the spread declined to just 4% 
in  late  ~ummer 1995.  After  a  temporary  increase  in  September,  mainly  caused  by  a 
weakness of  the US dollar, the spread resumed its downward trend by the end of 1995. By 
June 1996  the  spread  had  narrowed  to  below  2%.  This rather pt"omising  performance 
continued until the autumn.  In general,  although temporary tensions  occurred,  the ERM 
has been characterised by a high degree of  stability during most of 1996. 
Within the ERM band (see Graph 5.2), the DM, the guilder, the schilling and the Belgian 
franc  have been strong throughout the two-year period.  In 1995,  the  peseta recovered 
sharply in the two months after its devaluation,  and it has  remained  strong in  1996.  By 
contrast,  the  Irish  punt,  affected  by  the  course  of the  dollar  and  sterling,  weakened 
considerably in the first quarter of 1995  an~, though it strengthened thereafter, it remained 
below its central rate until May 1996, but it has since recovered strongly. The French franc 
traded in  the lower part of the band for  most of the two years,  but more recently the 
French  franc  recovered  closer to  its  central  rate.  The  escudo  and  the  Danish  krone 
generally remained close to their central rates. 
In sum,  currently nine  currencies  have been members of the ERM for  over two years: 
DKR, BFR, DM, PTA, Ff, IRL,  ~FR, HFL and ESC.· The Austrian schilling will  have 
completed two years of membership by the end of 1996. With the exception of the PTA 
and the ESC, these currencies have not modified their central ERM parities over the past 
two years and, while large fluctuations have taken place in the band,  none of these eight 
currencies can be said to have undergone· severe tensions. The central rate of the peseta 
was devalued, in March 1995, at the request ofthe Spanish authorities. The central rate of 
the Portuguese escudo was also adjusted downwards following the decision to change the 
central  rate  of the  Spanish  currency!.  Since  the  middle  of October 1996  the  Finnish 
markka has also been a member ofthe ERM. 
5.2 Further analysis of exchange rate stability 
Similar indications are obtained if stability of exchange rates is considered in terms of the 
coefficient of variation2  ,  .which  enables  cr•.,ss-currency  comparisons.  Graph 5.3  depicts 
variability against the DM. 
I 
2 
EU Comnmniquc, 6 March 1995 
Defined as the stand:ud deviation divided by the me:m 48 
It can be seen that,  after the turbulence of the first  half of 1995, the variability of most 
currencies returned to previously prevailing levels.  Also,  ERM currencies varied by less 
than those outside:  in the two-year period,  on  average,  the five  currencies  outside the 
ERM are also  the ones that displayed  the greatest variability;  among these,  the Finnish 
markka has fluctuated the least and has been comparatively stable in  1995 and  1996. The 
lira  and  the  Swedish krona were  the  most  volatile.  Inside  the  ERM,  the  guilder,  the 
schilling  and  the Belgian franc  have displayed  minimal  variability  and  the  Danish krone 
joined that group from November 1995.  The variability of the other ERM currencies has 
also tended to be lower in  1996 than in earlier years. 
Domestic causes of  foreign exchange unrest include concern over the capacity of  countries 
or the willingness of  governments to achieve the high degree of convergence required for 
a single currency. In addition, the development of  fundamentals, mainly public tinance and 
inflation but also unemployment, exerted direct influence on exchange rate developments. 
Some influence,  mostly towards  appreciation  and  stability,  was  exerted  on  the  Finnish 
markka and the Italian lira, as a result of  expectations for joining the ERM. 
In  1996,  a number of factors contributed to  the casing of tensions in  foreign exchange 
markets. Firstly, the recovery of the US dollar played a most important role: from below 
1.40 DM in late  1995, the dollar rose to about  1.54 DM in June 1996; the dollar pulled 
upwards  mainly  sterling  and  the  punt  and  generally  reinforced  the  weaker European 
currencies  against  the  stronger  group.  This  also  had  a  considerable  bearing  on  the 
functioning of the ERM by reducing the spread  between the weakest and the strongest 
currencies. Subsequently, a temporary weakening of the dollar, which fell  to 1.48 DM in 
July 1996, did not have a substantial effect on the ERM spread; renewed strength in the 
doliar in  September and  October 1996  was  accompanied  by  a  slight  widening  of the 
spread as the punt appreciated further and became the strongest currency in the ERM. 
Secondly,  a  more  synchronised  cycle  in  the  European  economies  and  prospects  for 
disinflation in  the higher inflation countries allowed  parallel  monetary policy nioves and 
reduced the scope for speculative behaviour. 
Finally, trading in relation to convergence prospects was a very important factor. From the 
second  half of 1995,  governments  increasingly  took conspicuous  measures  to improve 
their convergence  situation.  bt the  same  time,  the  European  authorities  demonstrated 
repeatedly their determination to proceed to Monetary Union; particularly after the Madrid 
European  Council,  where  the  realisation  of EMU in  1999  became.  a  certainty.  These 
prospects contributed to the calming of exchange rates and to the substantial reduction of 
.. interest rate differentials. 49 
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6. LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES 
6.1 Interest rate convergence 
The criterion addressed here,  as  defined by the fourth indent of Article 109j(1) of the 
Treaty,  is  "the  durability  of convergence  achieved by  the  Member  State  and of its 
participation in the exchange rate mechanism of  the European Monetary System being 
reflected in  the  long-term  interest  rate  levels".  This  criterion on  the  convergence of 
interest rates  is  developed  further  in  the  Protocol  No 6 on the  convergence criteria, 
Article 4 of which states that the criterion  "shall mean that,  observed over a period of 
one year before the examination, a Member State has had an average long-tenn interest 
rate that does not exceed by more than  2 percentage points that of,  at most,  the three 
best peifonning  Member  States  in  terms  of price  stability".  It  goes  on to  say  that 
"Interest  rates  shall  be  measured  on  the  basis  of long-term  government  bonds  or 
comparable sectirities, taking into account differences in national definitions. " 
The unweighted arithmetic average of the  12-month average of the  long-term interest 
rate of the three best performers in terms of inflation has  been used in this report for 
the  calculation  of the  reference  value  (see  also analysis  of Chapter 3).  For  most 
Member  States,  the  yield  on  the  ten-year  benchmark  bond  is.  the  one  used  in  the 
calculations.  Efforts  have  been made  to  make  these  data  as  comparable  as  possible. 
Further details  on the interest rates used  for each Member State are contained in the 
box  on  "Data and  reference  value  for  the  interest rate  convergence  criterion".  All 
references  to  the long-term interest rate in this  section refer  to  the  average over the 
latest 12 months of the nominal long-term interest rate. 
The three best performing Member States with respect to  consumer price inflation!  in  · 
September 1996  were:  Germany,  the  Netherlands  and  Finland.  The average nominal 
long-term  interest  rates  for  these  countries  in  September  were,  respectively:  6.3%, 
6.3% and 7.4%, producing a reference·value of 8.7%  (see Table 6.1).  Two of these 
three countries  also had  the  lowest average  interest rates,  namely,  Germany and  the 
Netherlands.  In  all,  eleven  Member  States  had  average  interest  rates  below  the 
reference value in September 1996. These were: Belgium, Denmark, Germany,. France, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
Four Member States  (Greece,  Spain,  Italy,  and  Portugal)  had  average  interest  rates 
above the reference value. Sweden's average interest rate was above the reference value 
at the  end  of 1995  but,  having  declined  during  1996,  it  moved  below  the  reference 
value in August 1996. 
TI1e  price index used to  establish the  three best performers is  the interim index of consumer prices 
(IICP) from December 1995 and the consumer price index (CPI) before then (sec Chapter 3). 51 
Table 6.1 
Long-term interest rate convergence in the 
Member States 
12-month average 
1993  1994  1995  1996(1) 
Three best price performers 
B  - - 7.5  -
DK  7.3  7.9  - -
D  - - - 6.3 
F  - 7.2  - -
IRL  7.7  - - -
L  - 7.7  - -
NL  - - 6.9  6.3 
FIN  - - 8.8  7.4 
UK  7.5  - - -
Reference  9.5  9.6  9.7  8.7 
value 2 
Member States respecting the reference value 
Number:  8  8  10  11 
out of:  12  12  15  15 
B  7.2  7.9  7.5  6.7 
DK  7.3  7.9  8.3  7.4 
D  6.5  7.1  6.9  6.3 
F  6.8  7.2  7.5  6.6 
IRL  7.7  7.9  8.3  7.5 
L  6.5  7.7  7.6  7.0 
NL  6.3  6.9  6.9  6.3 
A  - - 7.1  6.5 
FIN  - - 8.8  7.4 
s  - - - 8.5 
UK  7.5  8.2  8.3  8.0 
(I) Oct. 1995 to Sep. 1996 
(2) Definition adopted in this report: arithmetic average of 
the 12-month average of interest rates of  the three best 
performing Member States in terms of  price stability 
plus 2 percentage points. 
&w.rll..: EM/. 
This  impression  of an  improvement  in 
the convergence situation since the end 
of  1995  IS  confirmed  when  the 
underlying  situation  of  individual 
Member  States  is  considered  (see 
Graph 6.1  and  Table 6.2).  During  this 
period,  the.  reference  value  gradually 
declined, and the dispersion around this 
reference value diminished  from  2.0 at 
the  end  of  1995  .  to  1.6  by 
September 1996  (sec  Table 6.2). 
Underlying  this  general  trend  are 
somewhat  different  developments  in 
Member  States  satisfying  the  criterion 
and those not satisfying the criterion at 
the end of 1995.  Although all  countries 
experienced  falling  average  rates,  the 
pace  of the  fall  was  considerably  less 
among  ·those  Member  States  in  the 
former  group  than  those  in  the  latter 
group.  Finland,  with  a  fall  in  the 
average  rate  of  1.4 percentage  points 
between the end of 1995 and September 
1996,  provided  an  exception  to  this 
latter  obsetvation.  Indeed,  the  fall  in 
Finnish  rates  accounts  for  the  major 
part of the  fall  in the  reference value, 
while  the  falls  in  the  five  Member 
States not respecting the reference value 
at the end  of 1995  help  to  explain the 
reduction in dispersion.  Compared with 
December  1995,  the  interest  rate 
convergence  gap  (the  difference 
between  the  average  domestic  interest 
rate  and  the  reference  value)  fell  for 
Greece,  Italy,· "Spain  and  Portugal, 
respectively  to  6.4 percentage  points 
(-1.3),  1.6 percentage  points  (-0.9), 
0.8 percentage  points  (-0.8),  and 
0.7 percentage  points  (-1.1).  Greece 
remains the least convergent Member State, while Sweden moved from a divergence of 
0.5 pe1·centage  points  at .the  end  of 1995  to  being  0.2 perc~ntage points  below  the 
reference value in September 1996. 52 
Table 6.2 
Development of long-tenn interest rates 
12-month average  I 
1993 (1)  1994(1)  1995(1)  1996(1) (2) 
B  7.2  7.9  7.5  6.7 
DK  7.3  7.9  8.3  7.4 
D  6.5  7.1  6.9  6.3 
EL  23.3  20.8  17.4  15.1 
E  10.2  10.0  11.3  9.5 
F  6.8  7.2  7.5  6.6 
IRL  7.7  7.9  8.3  7.5 
I  11.2  10.5  12.2  10.3 
L  6.5  7.7  7.6  7.0 
NL  6.3  6.9  6.9  6.3 
A  6.7  7.0  7.1  6.5 
p  9.7  10.5  11.5  9.4 
FIN  8.8  9.1  8.8  7.4 
s  8.5  9.7  10.2.  8.5 
UK  7.5  8.2  8.3  8.0 
pro memoria · 
Average of3 
best price 
perfonners  7.5  7.6  7.7  6.7 
Dispersion 
from average 
1.6  1.5  2.0  1.6  of3 best price 
_pcrfonners  _(3) 
(1) For 1993, data are non-comparable for Luxembourg (January -September} and 
Portugal (January-June). For Greece data are non-<Xliilparable. 
(2) Average of October 1995 to September 1996. 
(3) Measured by the standard deviation around the average of  the 3 best price 
performers (Greece omitted from calculations in all years; Luxembourg 
omitted from calculations in 1993). 
Source: EM/. 
Within  the  group  of 
countries  meeting  the 
criterion,  the  picture  was 
somewhat  different.  In 
. general,  the  pace  of  the 
decline  in  average  long-
term rates over the review 
period was less than in the 
group  of  countries  not 
satisfying  ·the  criterion. 
This  was  to  be  expected 
since  long-term  rates  in 
these  countries  were 
already  low  (see 
Graph q.1).  Finland 
provides  an  exception  to 
the  general  trend.  The 
strong  decline  in  Finnish 
long-term  rates,  together 
with  the  levelling  off of 
rates  in  the 
United Kingdom,  saw  the 
latter replacing Finland as 
the  Member  State  in this 
group  ·with  the  highest 
long-term  rates.2.  The 
dispersion  within  the 
group  itself  declined. 
Excluding  Sweden,  the 
spread between the lowest 
interest  rate  (Germany: 
6.9%)  and  the  highest 
interest  rate  (Finland: 
8.8%) was  1.9 percentage 
points  at  the  end  of  1995.  This  fell  to  1.7 percentage  points  (=8.0%  for  the 
United Kingdom less 6.3% for the Netherlands) in September 1996.  Including Sweden, 
the spread in September 1996 was higher at 2.2 percentage points.  ' 
2  Until Sweden became a member of this group in August 1996. I  •  I<, 
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6.2 Recent developments in long-term interest rates 
In  this  section,  the  recent  evolution  of long-term  interest  rates  is  analysed  by  a 
consideration of the  paths  followed  by  monthly  nominal  long-term  interest  rates  (as 
opposed to the 12-month averages of the previous section) in the Member States and at 
the level of the Union as  a whole.  The sharp upward movement in nominal long-ternl. 
rates  in  the European Union in  1994,  was  followed  by a  steady  downward trend in 
1995.  After a brief interruption at the beginning of the ·year,  this downward path has 
continued  in  1996  (see  Graph 6.3).  Falling  long-term  interest  rates  in  1995  were 
generally. seen as  an international phenomenon stemming from a slowdown of growth 
in  the  USA,  deflationary  pressures  in  Japan,  and  perceptions  of lower  inflationary 
pressures in Europe. 
Revisions  in market expectations about the  likelihood of official interest  r~tes cuts  in 
Germany and the US were widely cited as the reason for the upward spike in long-term 
interest rates at the beginning of 1996. Expectations that a policy of monetary easing in 
Germany  had  reached a turning point surfaced towards the  end of January.  This  was 
compounded  in  February by. expectations  of a  tightening  of monetary  policy  in  the 
USA,  the  effect  of which  spilled  over  from  US  to  European  bond  markets.  This 
international  trend  was  driven  partly  by  market  fears  of  excess  global  liquidity 
following  the  sustained reduction in interest rates  in  the major economics  throughout 
1995.  . 55 
1:.: .. .  ·;<~·: 
:.··  ·;,:p ,:: -------------------------- - ---------- ~------------- ------ -~·.-
.,,  ... :·.r 
,. '  -~ ,,, 
.. 
:  ·.,·.  ~-·  . 
~  ~  ~  :' 
;' .·.·  ·;. 






- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _I- -
1 ••  7  -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -·- - - -
I 
I 
•  ,·  f 
'··  ·'  ,_, 
".,_  ' 
..~-,..;:' 
f  , .. 
-,.•., ..... 
The resumption of downward trend in average nominal long-term rates in the EU since 
April 1996  may be explained by a number of factors.  These include:  a decoupling of 
trends  in the USA  and some European bond markets  in the second quarter of 1996; 
and,  in  the  third  quarter,  another  shift  in  market  expectations  concerning  US  and 
Japanese monetary policy, this time away from a near-tertn tightening,  which resulted 
in internationally  falli~g long-term rates.  In September 1996, the average level of bond 
yields  in  the  EU  recorded · a  level  of  7.2%,  1 percentage  point  lower  than  in 
September 1995 and below the level of 7.3% recorded in January 1996. 
A number of features in the evolution of long-term interest rates across Member States 
may  be  highlighted.  First, although long-term rates fell  in all EU countries over the 
period between September 1995 and September 1996, the size of the  fall varied across 
countries (see Table 6.3).  In general, those countries with the highest long-term rates 
experienced the  largest falls:  Italy,  Portugal, Spain and Sweden recorded reductions in 
the range of 1.8-2.9 percentage points. 56 
Table 6.3 
Recent evolution of long-term interest rates 
Monthly average of daily data 
September  September  Changc(pps) 
1995  1996 
B  7.0  6.5  -0.5 
DK  7.8  7.2  -0.6 
D  6.6  6.2  -0.4 
EL  15.8  14.8 (Feb)  -1.0 
E  10.8  8.4  -2.4 
F  7.4  6.2  -1.2 
IRL  8.0  7.2  -0.8 
I  11.5  9.2  -2.3 
L  7.4  6.8  -0.6 
NL  6.6  6.1  -0.5 
A  6.9  6.3  -0.6 
p  11.2  8.3  -2.9 
FIN  8.0  6.9  -1.1 
s  9.6  7.8  -1.8 
UK  8.1  8.0  -0.1 
EUR (1)  8.2  7.2  -1.0 
(1) : weighted average using 1995 GDP weights 
Source: EM!. 
In Greece the decline was less, so 
that long-term rates  remain high3 
.  Among  the  countries  already 
with lower interest rates, Finland, 
also  benefiting  from  lower 
inflation expectations,  recorded a 
substantial  reduction 
(1.1 percentage  points).  Given 
that  the  largest  interest  rate 
reductions,  over  the  ·year  to 
September 1996, were realised by 
those  Member  States  with  the 
highest  nominal  long-term  rates, 
interest  rate  differentials  over 
corresponding  German  bonds 
narrowed4  during  the  year,  with 
Spain, Italy, Portugal and Sweden 
experiencing  the  largest 
reductions. 
Second,  while  all  EU  countries 
shared common trends in nominal 
long-term  rates  between 
August 1995  and  March 1996, 
there  has  been some  divergence 
of experience among Member States since then.  Following the brief upward blip in the 
first quarter, all countries except the United Kingdom recorded reductions  once again 
during April.  For Belgium, Denmark, Germany,  Luxembourg and Austria, long-term 
rates  rose over the period May-June, before dropping once again in July-August.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  downward  trend  persisted  in  the  high-yield  countries,  namely, 
Spain, Italy and Portugal. 
6.3 Explanatory factors and assessment 
Progress  was  made  over  the  last  year  in  terms  of interest  rate  convergence,  with 
Sweden satisfying this convergence criterion from August 1996 and the remaining four 
countries  (Greece,  Spain,  Italy  and  Portugal)  moving  nearer  the  reference  value. 
Spain,  Italy  and Portugal also  recorded considerable narrowing  of their  interest rate 
convergence gaps. Indeed, if the current levels of interest rates were to be maintained, 
the average long-term rates for Spain and Portugal would very shortly come under the 
3 
4 
It should be noted that the data for Greece arc not comparable to  the data  for other Member States. 
In  the absence of a long-term capital market a bond with an original maturity of 5 years is  used.  In 
addition, the existence of a reporting lag in the receipt of the data hampers up-to-date comparisons. 
For all countries cxcepHhe United Kingdom. 57. 
reference  va!ue.  This  favourable  development  may  be  attributed  to  a  number  of 
underlying  factors.  One  important  factor  is  the  declining  inflation  rates  in  these 
countries, which in turn helped to  reduce inflation 'expectations. This is  particularly the 
case  for  Spain,  Portugal and  Sweden,  which recorded  sizeable  reductions  in average 
inflation rates between December 1995 and September 1996. Compared to the previous 
year,  the  rapid  reduction  in  inflation  in  Portugal  appears  to .  have  affected  long-term 
interest rates.  Greece's less  spectacular progress  in  terms  of inflation,' given the high 
starting point,  may help explain the slower progress  in  terms  of reducing the  interest 
rate gap in this country. 
A second important explanatory factor was the efforts made in these countries in terms 
of reducing  government  deficits.  Such  progress  in  government  deficit  consolidation 
contributed  to  a  more  balanced  policy  mix  and  thus  to  reducing  the  credit  risk 
premium.  The progressive calming of exchange rate  markets  during the  1996 created 
conditions for a stabilising of bond markets. 58 
DATA AND REFERENCE VALUE FOR THE INTEREST RATE 
CONVERGENCE CRITERION 
Data 
According to Article 4 of  the Protocol on the convergence criteria: 
"Interest  rates  shall  be  measured  on  the  basis  of long-term  government  bonds  or 
comparable securities, taking into account differences in national definitions." 
According to Article 5 of the same Protocol, the Commission shall provide the statistical 
data for the application of the interest rate convergence criterion.  In agreement with the 
European  Monetary  Institute,  which  has  a  comparative  advantage  in  the  analysis  of 
financial statistics and has  advised the Commission on the issue, interest rates with the 
following characteristics have been deemed the most appropriate for the examination of 
the interest rate criterion: 
- maturity: residual maturity close to 10 years (9 to 10.5 years) 
- issuer: central government (in Germany including Treuhandanstalt) . 
- choice of bonds: liquidity is the main selection critcqon; the. choice between a single 
benchmark or the average of a  sample  should be based on this  requirement;  most 
(eleven)  Member States  choose a  benchmark  (Belgium,  Denmark,  France,  Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom), while 
three Member States choose an average (Germany, Spain, Portugal) 
- aggregation:  simple average  should be  used  if there  is  more than one bond in the 
sample 
- gross oftax · 
- yield calculation: ISMA-formula for yield to maturity 
- coupon: fixed 
In Greece, in the absence of  a long-term capital market a bond with an original maturity 
of  5 years was selected.  Its coupon is indexed to the 12-month treasury bill and adjusted 
yearly. Contrary to the other Member States where daily quotatio~s are available, an end-
of-month figure is used. 
The present evaluation of the  long-term interest rate criterion. is based on harrnonised 
long-term interest rates, incorporating the above characteristics. 
Reference value 
According to  Article 4 of the Protocol on the convergence criteria, the criterion on the 
convergence of interest rates "shall mean that,  observed over a period ofone year before 
this examination,  a Member State has had an  average nominal long term interest rate 
that docs not exceed by more tlian  2 percentage points that of, at most,  the three best 
peiforming Member State~ in terms of  pric'} stability." 
· The unweighted arithmetic average interest rate of  the three best performers in terms of 
price stability·is used in this examination of the interest rate criterion for the calculation 
of  the reference value. 59 
7.  SUPPLEMENTARY INFORl\1ATION 
This  chapter  reviews  developments  is  several  other  areas  which  arc  required  by 
Article 109j(1) to be taken account of  by the Commission (and the EMI) in their reports. 
The  following  sections  examine  the  developments  of the  ECU,  the  results  of the 
integration of markets,  the situation and  development of the  balances  of payments on 
current account and the development of  unit labour costs and other price indices. 
7.1  Development of the ECU 
The ECU markets encountered difficult conditions in 1995  and much of 1996. Primary 
bond  market  activity  contracted  to  historically  low  levels,  though  secondary  market 
turnover  proved  to  be  more  robust.  A  degree of stability  was  provided  by sovereign 
issuers through  the continuation of regular debt programmes in  ECU but, ·with  private 
issuers  largely ignoring the ECU, liquidity in the market was much reduced.  From the 
start of the se:cond half of 1996 interest in the ECU began to recover as confidence in the 
EMU  process  developed  and  perceived  uncertainties,  like  the  start date of monetary 
union,  the  1:1  substitution of the euro  for  the ECU and  continuity· of ECU contracts, 
began to crumble. \Vith the release of  the regulations on the legal framework for the euro 
positive  market  sentiment  towards  the  ECU  has  firmed,  and  market  analysts  now 
anticipate a return to growth in the ECU markets in the run up to 1 January 1999 and the 
start of  monetary union. 
One manifestation of the ECU's difficulties was the emergence from the middle of 1994 
of a persistent spread, in excess of 50 basis points, between the market exchange rate 
value of the ECU and its theoretical value.  In an historical context, ±20 basis points had 
been  considered  to  be the  normal  trading  range of the  spread;  moreover,  on those 
occasions when the spread exceeded its normal range, in particular d·uring the ERM crises 
in 1992 and 1993, it had done so for only a short period of time before arbitrage activity 
by the so-called "basket makers" brought the spread rapidly down to more norm'al levels. 
Towards  the  end of 1994,  the  spread - though still volatile- had  contracted,  reaching 
around 20 basis points. However, with the subsequent re-emergence of ERM tensions in 
early 1995 the spread rapidly increased reaching a high of 152 basis points by the end of 
March  1995.  Though  it  subsequently  fell  to  under  100 basis  points  this  was  only  a 
temporary respite. The spread reached over 300 basis points at  the end of 1995. During 
the  first  half of 1996  confidence began to  return to the  ECU markets  and  the  spread 
tended to  fluctuate between 150 and 250 basis points, with a slow fall  commencing in 
May.  During the second half of 1996 the  spread stabilised at  approximately  100 basis 
points  during July and August,  and then fell  to  below 60 basis  points  by the  end of 
September.  Subsequently the  spread has  contracted further  to  between 30  to  20 basis 
points. 
The underlying reasons, and their relative importance·, for the behaviour of the spread arc 
difficult to determine precisely, but a number of  factors have demonstrably played a role. 
First,  exchange  rate  tensions  in  the  ERM  have  had  a  negative  impact  on  the  ECU. 
Second,  there has been an increase in the perceived risk of nmning open positions in 60 
ECU, which has been reflected in the switch by the basket maker banks from a long-term 
strategy,  in which they were willing  to  hold  open positions  in ECU for considerable 
periods of time, to  a short-term strategy in which profits are taken as  soon as  possible 
even though greater profits would potentially have heen generated by holding the position 
for longer. 
In part also,  the increase in perceived risk stems from  a growing awareness that since 
1987  there has been no  institutionalised  link  between the market ECU and  the  basket 
apart  from  the conversion of ECU into  euro  at  1:1  upon  the  start of Stage Three,  on 
1 January 19991•  For many market  operators  the ·level  of uncertainty,  over the  EMU 
timetable and legal issues, was such that they took little comfort from the 1:1 provision in 
the Treaty. Thus uncertainty over EMU fed  through to concerns over the future value of 
the ECU.  However,  since the  European Council  in  Madrid in  December 1995,  market 
confidence has been growing as the high level of  political commitment to monetary union 
has  been  repeatedly demonstrated  and  the  uncertainties  over legal  issues,  such  as  the 
continuity  of contracts  and  the  1:1  conversion  of ECU into  euro,  have  largely  been 
removed by the regulations proposed by the Commission. 
The exchange rate value ofthe ECU may also have been damaged by the high level of  net 
redemptions of ECU denominated bonds in  1995 and  1996. Given a contraction in the 
stock of  outstanding ECU denominated bonds, the proceeds from repayments, funded by 
the drawing  down of existing  ECU deposits,  have tended to  be  exchanged  for  other 
currencies for reinvestment. This has put downward pressure on the exchange rate value 
of the ECU; however, as  confidence in EMU has grown so too confidence in the ECU 
markets has slowly been returning and the spread has reduced. 
During 1995, the amount of bond issues denominated in ECU was  significantly lower 
than the amount of maturing paper with the result that the stock of outstanding debt in 
ECU declined by 6%  to  ECU 127 billion (excluding  Greek ECU-linked bonds).  This 
compares to  a historic peak of ECU 140 billion steele outst;mding in  1993. During the 
first  nine  months  of 1996,  demand  for  ECU  from  institutional  investors  remained 
subdued and private issuers were few in number and wary. Issue activity was therefore 
low, with periods of  no issuing. The total amount issued during the first nine months of 
1996  amounted  to  ECU 10.9 billion  compared  with  ECU  13.5  billion  over the  same 
period in  1995. Thus with ECU 18.9 billion of maturing paper the stock of outstanding 
ECU denominated debt fell to ECU 119 billion by the end of  September 1996. 
In the secondary market, average turnover in ECU bonds rose in value terms by 8% in 
1995, its highest level since 1992.  In the first nine months of 1996 there was a further 
rise of  4%. As a percentage of  the total secondary market the share of the ECU declined 
from 5.6% in 1993 to 5.2% in 1994 and 1995, but rose slightly to 5.3% in 1996 (up to the 
end of  September). 
Until  1987  tlJC  institutionalised  link  was  also  provided  by  the  acceptance  by  the  ECU  Banking 
Association of  delivery' of  the basket in the settlement of  ECU positions in the clearing 61 
In contrast to the steady contraction of the ECU bond markets other ECU markets have 
performed better but have nevertheless registered decreases in activity. The approximate 
measure of commercial and financial  activi,ty provided by the daily average turnover in 
the  EBA  ECU  Clearing  System  has  experience  a  modest  fall  in  activity,  from 
ECU 50.0 billion during 1994 to ECU 46.8 billion during 1995, a year on year decrease 
of  6.5%. For the first nine months the average daily turnover in 1996 is some 2.1% lower 
than for 1995 at ECU 45.8 billion. 
Studies  of ECU  flows  related  to  commercial  transactions  (i.e.  purchase of goods  and 
services) as  opposed to  purely financial transactions suggest that commercial payments 
account for a small portion oftota1 payments (1996 results: 7.1% in volume terms, 0.7% 
value), but that nevertheless commercial ECU payments can be estimated to  be in  the 
region ofECU 50 billion to ECU 75 billion. 
7.2 Results of the integration of markets 
With an average of about 93% of Single Market legislation transposed  into  domestic 
legislation by all  Member States,  the Single Market is  becoming reality. It is  not yet 
complete, but the achievement so far should not ·be underestimated. It has already made 
the European Union the most economically integrated collection of nation states in the 
world. Evidence of  this deepening integration is accumulating. 
7.2.1 Market integration through trade 
By removing trade barriers between countries, the Single Market was expected to expand 
trade among EU Member States. In fact, between 1985 and 1995, the share of intia-EU 
imports in total manufacturing imports has indeed increased on average by 6. 7 percentage 
points from 61.2% in 1985 to  67.9% in 1995. Furthermore, intra-EU penetration ratios 
.increased much more in fifteen manufacturing industries identified ex ante as particularly 
sensitive to the Single Market project (SMP) than in all other manufacturing sectors. For 
services during the same period 1985-1995, the share of  intra-EU exports in total services 
exports has increased on average by 3.1 percentage points from 46.9% in 1985 to 50.0% 
in  1995.  Direct and pro-competitive effects of the SMP on trade almost fully  explain 
these changes in the market share ofintra-EU imports. 
Increasing economic integration may lead to greater country specialisation on the basis of 
their  respective  comparative  advantages  (inter-industry trade)  or it  may favour  intra-
industry  trade,  the  simultaneous  import  and  export  of similar product  lines  between 
Member States. 
Inter-industry trade between different countries carries efficiency gains, with each country 
specialising· in those activities  in  which it  is  relatively more.- efficient,  and consumers 
gaining lower  prices as a consequence. However, this'would imply a deeper specialisation 
between· the  less  developed  Member  States  and .  the  more  advanced,  each  country 
experiencing a contraction of some sectors and expansion of others, which may imply 
significant adjustment tosts. 62 
By contrast, intra-industcy trade benefits the consumer by leading to a much wider variety 
of  products, whilst producers face lower adjustment costs. Here, adjustments would take 
place amongst firms inside industries rather than amongst industries.  · 
At the beginning of the 1980s, most _trade within the Community could be classified as 
inter-industcy2 (around 45%). However, the preparation phase of the Single Market was 
accompanied by a decrease in  the share of inter-industry trade  in Europe and  a rise in 
intra-industcy trade - which itself could be further subdifferentiated: either intra-industry 
trade in similar products in terms of  prices and quality or intra-industry trade in products 
differentiated  by price  and  quality  (for  example,  one  countl}'  exporting  brand-name 
expensive shirts and the other inexpensive low quality shirts). The rise in intra-industry 
trade has predominantly been the  latter type (from  less  than 35% in  1985  to  more than 
42%  in  1994),  whilst  intra-industry  trade  in  similar products3  remained  rathe~ stable 
(around  20% of total  intra-EU trade).  The  SMP  has  therefore  increased  the  range of 
products available to consumers in terms of prices and quality, and encouraged differing 
business strategies: either emphasising design, research and development, and advertising 
in some cases (high price-quality) or production cost-minimising in others (low price). 
In the period  1985-94, all  EU countries have  experienced a decrease  in inter-industry 
trade, but especially Spain, the United Kingdom, France and Germany.  Nevertheless, in 
1994, inter-industry trade still accounted for over 58% of~e  total manufact:urlng trade of 
Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Denmark. At the same time, conversely, intra-industcy trade 
in price and quality-differentiated products represented over 42% of total trade for the 
United Kingdom, Germany, Fiance, Belgium; Ltixembourg a'nd the Netherlands, a share 
which  grew  between  1987  and  1994  for  all  this  group  of countries  plus  Spain  and 
Portugal. 
Analysis  of price  and  quality-differentiated  intra-industry  trade  shows  a  striking 
difference between northern and southern countries. Scrutiny of the contribution to the 
trade balance of low, medium and high price quality product ranges spotlights different 
countcy  groupings.  Germany  has  a  comparative  advantage  in  high  price  and  quality 
product ran.ges, France in medium to high price and quality ranges, the United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Denmark only in medium price and quality 
ranges, Spain in medium to low price and quality ranges, and Greece and Portugal only in 
low price and quality ranges.  These specialisations have been unaffected by moneta!}' 
fluctuations.  · 
In the period 1985-94, the share of  medium price and quality products in overall intra-EU 
trade has  declined (by some 10 percentage points)  to  the benefit of high price quality 
2 
3 
1here is inter-industry trade between two countries when one country's trade flow (imports or exports) 
with the other in a sector represents less than 10% of  the other country's tra.de flow (imports or exports) 
· with it in the same sector.  ·  · 
There is intra-industry trade in similar products when export and import unit values differ by less than 
15% and there is intra•industry trade in differentiated products when unit values differ by more than 
15%.  . 63 
products (plus 7 percentage points) and low price and quality products. This is especially 
so for the most advanced European economies, but even in the southern Member States, 
specialisation has changed and the share of low price and quality products has generally 
fallen whilst the share of  high price and quality pr?ducts has increased. 
Growing intra-industry trade with price differentiation implies that Member States  arc 
more and more specialised inside industries on products with differing price level ranges. 
For most advanced countries such an evolution involves growing intangible investment in 
R&D,  training,  innovations  to  compete  in  traditional  mature  industries,  and  for  less 
advanced countries, the possibility of  entering high tech and high value added sectors and 
competing on price  .. 
7. 2.2 A1arket integration tlzrouglz foreign direct investment 
Trade is not the only mechanism by which markets can become more integrated. Foreign 
direct investment (FDI) is an alternative to trade as a way of supplying foreign markets. 
Multinational companies are the main source ofFDI flows,  and the sales of  multinational 
foreign affiliates arc now by some estimates worth double the value of  world exports. 
In fact, impact on FDI of  the SMP seems to have been even more positive than its impact 
on trade.  The European Union absorbed 44.4% of  FDI inflows from all countries in the 
world  at  the  beginning  of the  1990s,  compared  to  28.2%  in  the  period  1982-87. 
Moreover, intra-EU FDI (i.e., FDI flows between Member States) increased four times 
faster than intra-EU trade in the period 1984-92.  Altogether, between 1984-85 and 1992-
93,  EU FDI inflow's  from  all  sources  increased  five  times  (seven times  for  intra-EU 
inflows). 
The impact on the  domestic  economy  of FDI  (FDI  inflows  relative to  GDP)  differs 
widely amongst Member States. At the beginning of  the 1990s, annual Irish FDI inflows 
were worth over 9% of GDP.  In Belgium and Luxembourg, the ratio was 4.7% a year. 
The Netherlands  (2.7%)  came  next,  then  Portugal  (2.6%),  the  UK (1.8%)  and  Spain 
(nearly 1.8%). By contrast, in Gcm1any (less than 0.4%), Italy (0.4%) and Greece (0.6%) 
these figures were very low. Over the period 1986-93, two Member States (Belgium and 
Ireland) have gained considerable ground in terms of attractiveness as locations for FDI. 
In general, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the Benelux countries arc· among the ones which 
have benefited most from the Single Market in terms ofFDI. 
7.2.3 Market integration and competition conditions inside tlze EU 
Cost reductions related to  size achieved over the period 1985-93 have been mostly the 
result of exploiting scale  advm.tages  linked  to  fixed  investments  in marketing,  brand 
development,  R&D  spending  and  development  of new  production  processes.  Few 
effici_cncy  improvements  have  been  the· consequence  of exploiting  purely  technical 
efficiency gains related to the size of  establishments. 64 
Nevertheless, sectors such as distribution and road freight transport do show remarkable 
productivity  gains.  Productivity  and  efficiency  gains  in  the  more  regulated  sectors 
(telecommunications, banking, airlines) have been less pronounced and, in general, it is 
very uncertain the extent to  which observed changes can be linked to the SMP.  Large 
gains have been observed only in liberalised telecommunication services. 
Evidence  on price  cost  margins  and  business  perceptions  seems  to  indicate  that  the 
efficiency gains associated with large size have been passed on to consumers and users 
thanks to  increased competition associated with the SMP.  Over the period  1980-1992, 
European manufacturing industry registered a trend recovery of price-cost margins, at a 
yearly rate  of about  2%,  controlling for  the  evolution of the economic cycle and  the 
diverging  industrial  structures  of the  EU  Member  States.  Within  this  overall  trend, 
however,  statistical  analysis  confirms  that  implementation  of  the  SMP  imposed 
increasing pressure on price-cost margins, thus ensuring that cost reductions have been 
passed on to  consumers and downstream users. It is  estimated that the SMP has led to  a 
yearly  1%  reduction  in  margins  since  1986/87.  That  is,  in  the  absence  of the  SMP, 
margins would have grown faster over the period. 
Competitive conditions in services have also been significantly altered by the SMP. A 
significant increase in competition is noticeable in sectors  such as  telecommunication 
services or retail banking, but also in airlines, where implementation of  the SMP has only 
been partial so far.  Overall, however, the increase in compc~ition seems to be less strong 
than in manufacturing sectors, reflecting that many regulations are still maintained on 
services  and  that  the  SMP  has  not been  fully  implemented  in  several  domains.  This 
increased competition has resulted in substantial and quite general reductions in prices in 
sectors such as telecommunications, and a more selective decline of  prices in segments of 
the airline and banking industries. 
In road freight transport, the margins for cross-border traffic have declined sharply over 
the period 1986-94.  The result has been a reduction in real transportation prices which, 
together with efficiency gains in the distribution sectors, have led to substantial changes 
in the sourcing patterns of  manufacturing and retailing firms.  A wider range of  sourcing 
possibilities has contributed to declines in input costs. 
The changes in structures and the degree of competition of European markets prompted 
by  the  implementation of the  SMP have also  resulted in increased price convergence 
across the EU for many goods. Between 1990 and 1993 the variation between Member 
States in prices (including taxes) has decreased from 22.8% to  19.6% in consumer goods 
and from 31.8% to 28.6% in services, but increased 28% to 31.7% in energy. 65 
7.3  Situation and development of balances of payments on current account 
Following deficits in both 1991  and  1992, the current account of the Union as  a whole 
has recorded either a zero balance, in 1993 and 1994, or a small surplus, in 1995; a larger 
Table 7.1 
Current account balance 
(national accounts definition, %of 
GDP) 
1993  1994  1995  1996 
(1) 
B  3.8  4.0  4.5  4.1 
DK  2.9  1.6  0.6  1.0 
D  -1.1  -1.4  -1.2  -0.9 
EL  -1.7  -1.0  -2.7  -3.0 
E  -1.0  -1.2  0.9  0.9 
F  1.0  1.0  1.6  1.7 
IRL  5.3  3.4  4.3  3.7 
I  1.0  1.5  2.4  3.6 
L  15.2  15.9  17.9  16.3 
NL  4.9  5.2  5.2  4.9  \ 
A  -0.4  -1.0  -2.3  -1.9 
p  -2.1  -1.8  -0.2  -1.0 
FIN  -1.3  1.3  4.5  4.0 
s  -1.4  -0.7  0.6  1.2 
UK  -2.5  -2.1  -1.8  -1.8 
EUR  0.0  0.0  0.2  1.0 
I) Autumn 1996 economic forecasts. 
S!lltrcl'· Commission services. 
surplus  is  expected  in  1996.  These balances,  apart 
from  being  indicators  of the  amount  of national 
savings, have in recent years become signals of the 
state  of domestic  absorption  relative  to  domestic 
output.  With· complete·  liberalization  of  capital 
movements,  and  the  removal  of residual  exchange 
controls  by some  Member  States  in the  past  two 
years,  financial  integration  has  continued  to 
progress, and the Union's financial  markets are now 
closely  integrated  with  international  financial  and 
capital  markets.  Consequently,  the  international 
allocation  process  of excess  domestic  savings  or 
excess  domestic  spending  is  facilitated.  Several 
Member States have systematically recorded current 
account surpluses since the beginning of the 1990s 
(Belgium,  Denmark,  France,  Ireland,  Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands), while in others current account 
deficits  of earlier  years  have  become  surpluses 
(Spain, Italy, Finland and Sweden); in five Member 
States (Germany, Greece, Austria, Portugal and the 
United Kingdom) the current account has remained 
in  deficit  since the beginning  of the  decade  (sec 
Table 7.1). 
In a majority of Member  .States the current account balance has been improving, despite 
the recovery of economic growth, ·since the end of the recession of the early 1990s.  An 
important factor in this has been the reduction of fiscal imbalances and the consequent 
increase in national savings. Balance of payments positions relative to GDP in 1996 are 
not estimated to change markedly compared to the previous year; latest estimates by the 
Commission services show reductions in the surplus in Belgium, Ireland,  Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands and Finland, and a widening· ofthe deficit in ·Greece and Portugal. The 
surplus is likely to rise in 1996 in Denmark, France, Italy and Sweden, and the deficit is 
expected to narrow in Germany and Austria. The current account surplus in Spain and the 
deficit in  the United Kingdom arc likely to  be similar in scale in  1996  to  the previous 
year. 
7.4 Examination of development of unit labour costs and other price indices 
Developments  in  various  consumer  price  indices· (IICP,  CP(  private  consumption 
deflator) contain important, albeit incomplete, information on the inflation environment 
prevailing  in  an  economy (see  Chapter 3).  To  ensure  a  comprehensive  and  balanced 
examination  of the  degree  of price  stability  and  the  sustainability  of the  inflation 66 
performance,  the  Treaty (Article  1  09j  (1 ))  also  requires  that  "the development of  unit 
labour costs and other price indices" should be considered. 
7.4.1  Unit labour costs 
Developments in unit labour costs take on a particular importance in the inflation process. 
They reflect trends in labour productivity and  nominal compensation of employees per 
head. The latter not only play a key role in the determination of input costs and thus of 
consumer prices,  but also  reflect private  agents'  inflation expectations.  They therefore 
serve as an important indicator, amongst others, of the credibility of  the anti-inflationary 
policy stance pursued by the monetary authorities. 
At  the  Community level,  growth  in  nominal  compensation  per  employee has  slowed 
down steadily from 4.2% in 1993 to 3.4% in 1996, thereby reaching a level never attained 
over the  past  35 years.  This  deceleration was common to  most  Community countries, 
though to a varying extent (sec Table 7.2). The salient exceptions arc Italy, Sweden, and, 
to a lesser extent, Denmark. Over the same period, the increase in nominal-compensation 
per employee accelerated from 3.7% to 6.2% in Italy, and from 4.4% to 6.6%.in Sweden. 
This  means that wage growth is  now  above  the  inflation rate,  which could generate 
wage/price tensions when economic activity speeds up. 
Three major factors seem to explain the generally observed moderation in nominal wages. 
Firstly,- as  already noted, wage settlements appear to  increasingly incorporate inflation 
expectations consistent with the price objectives announced by the monetary authorities. 
Secondly, wage negotiations seem to  have increasingly taken into account developments 
in  the  real  side of the  economy (output  growth,  laboirr  market situation,  profitability 
concerns). Thirdly, actions to improve labour market flexibility have been undertaken in 
several Member States, including among others incentives for unemployed people to look 
for  a job more actively, reforms of the educational  and  training  system,  measures  to 
increase flexibility of  working time and of rules governing employment conditions, and 
measures  to  improve  the  efficiency  of employment  services.  This  set  of structural 
measures should help to avoid excessive upward pressure on wages when activity speeds 
up, allowing unemployment to come down. 
The second element which influences unit labour costs is labour productivity. The latter 
has shown the usual cyclical pattern over the past few years. After slowing down during 
the recession of 1993, gains  in labour productivity picked up  in  1994,  along with the 
rebound  in  economic  activity.  However,  the  growth  slowdown  experienced  in  the 
Community from mid-1995 again drove down apparent labour productivity growth, both 
in 1995 and in 1996. 
As a result, growth in nominal unit labour costs was very modest over the  1994-1995 
. period. In 1994, eight countries showed an  actual deCline in unit labour costs, while in 
~995, growth in unit labour costs was at or below 2~%  in all Member States, with the 
exception of Greece. Thus, apart from Greece, growth in unit labour costs was below the 
inflation rate in all the Community countries over this two year period. This favourable 67 
evolution is mainly the result of moderate wage increases but is  helped by the cyclical 
rebound in labour productivity grO\Vth.  · 
The moderate trend in unit labour costs has continued in 1996. While an acceleration is 
noticeable, the increase in unit labour costs remains consistent with continued favourable 
inflation trends in the Community an·d  in most Member States.  An acceleration in unit 
labour costs is expected in Spain, Italy and Sweden, and to a lesser extent in Denmark, 
Portugal, Finland, and the UK.  For most of these countries,  this  acceleration remains 
moderate ·and leaves the increase in labour costs below or close to the inflation rate, with 
the  exception of Italy.  In addition,  this  strengthening could be short-lived as  it  partly 
reflects cyclical factors. 
Table 7.2 
Labour costs 
{percentage change, total economy) 
Nominal compensation per  Labour productivity growth  Nominal unit labour costs 
employee 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1993  1994  1995  1996  1993  1994  1995  1996 
(I)  (I)  (I) 
B  3.5  4.4  2.5  1.6  0.0  2.9  1.5  1.5  3.5  1.4  1.0  0.1 
DK  1.6  3.6  3.6  4.1  2.5  5.0  l.l  1.5  -0.8  -1.4  2.5  2.6 
D  4.3  3.2  3.8  2.6  0.6  3.6  2.2  2.2  3.6  -0.4  1.5  0.4 
EL  10.1  11.9  12.7  11.1  -3.2  -0.4  1.1  1.2  13.7  12.3  11.5  9.8 
E  6.5  3.1  3.0  3.9  2.6  2.7  1.1  0.8  3.7  0.4  1.9  3.1 
F  2.8  2.2  2.3  2.2  -0.2  2.9  1.0  1.3  2.9  -0.7  1.4  0.9 
IRL  6.7  2.3  l.l  4.0  3.0  4.1  6.1  4.3  3.6  -1.7  -4.6  -0.2 
I  3.7  3.0  5.2  6.2  1.8  3.7  3.4  0.5  1.9  -0.7  1.7  5.7 
L  5.2  3.7  3.8  3.4  -1.7  1.0  0.9  1.1  7.0  2.7  2.8  2.2 
NL  3.3  2.4  2.0  1.0  0.9  3.3  0.2  1.0  2.5  -0.8  1.8  0.0 
·A  4.6  3.1  3.8  2.9  0.8  2.9  2.1  1.7  3.7  0.2  1.6  1.2 
p·  9.1  8.2  5.3  5.8  0.7  0.9  2.9  2.0  8.3  7.2  2.3  3.8 
FIN  1.0  3.5.  4.7  4.0  5.7  5.6  3.1  1.0  -4.4  -2.0  1.5  2.9 
s  4.4  5.4  3.1  6.6  3.2  3.6  1.4  2.3  1.2  1.7  1.7  4.1 
UK  4.3  3.5  2.9  3.3  3.7  3.8  1.8  1.9  0.5  -0.3  1.2  1.4 
EUR  4.2  3.3  3.5  3.4  1.4  3.3  1.9  1.5  2.7  0.0  1.5  1.9 
I) Autumn 1996 economic forecasts. 
Snurr.r; Commission services. 
7.4.2 Import prices 
Given the incre<1;5ed  degree of international openness of. the Community economy, the 
evolution of import prices plays an important role in domestic price formation.  Import 
prices in domestic currency are the synthesis of the evolution of several differeri;. factors: 
the  value  of the  exchange rate,  international  prices)  the  geographical  composition of 
imports and the price-setting behaviour of  foreign suppliers. Table 7.3 
Import price inflation 
(percentage change in the deflator of 
imports of  goods and services, in national 
currency; national accounts basis)  .I 
1993  1994  1995  1996 
(1) 
B  -2.6  0.9  0.5  1.6 
DK  -1.1  0.4  1.3  2.1 
D  -1.5  05  0.7  0.7 
EL  9.1  8.3  7.1  4.0 
E  6.6  6.0  4.2  0.9 
F  -2.5  1.7  1.3  1.8 
IRL  4.4  2.8  4.2  '  0.5 
I  12.1  5.0  11.7  -0.6 
L  5.4  0.2  0.5  3  .I 
NL  -2.3  0.6  0.2  2.0 
A  0.8  0.7  0.9  1.2 
p  8.9  4.5  1.5  1.2 
FIN  8.7  -0.3  0.4  2.3 
s  14.5  3.3  5.1  -3.1 
UK  8.4  1.9  7.3  2.0 
EUR  3.1  2.2  3.8  1.1 
(1) Autumn 1996 economic forecasts. 
Source:  Commission services. 
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Several elements had helped in keeping the growth in 
. import prices very moderate between 1990 and 1992: 
low oil  prices,  a weak US  dollar,  progress in  trade 
liberalisation,  coupled  with  the  completion  of the 
internal market.  As a result,  contributions of import 
prices to final demand inflation were negative in most 
Member  States  (and  to  varying  degree)  over  this 
period. 
However, the effects of some of these factors were 
reversed  or weakened  during  the  1993-95  period. 
Oil  prices  increased  at  a  relatively  £1st  pace  in  the 
first  half of 1994 and  again in  early  1995,  while the 
dollar strengthened somewhat in  1993  and  1994.  In 
addition, the curbing impact on prices exerted by the 
single market gradually faded. 
The upward impact of these factors on import prices 
varied  strongly  country  by  country,  depending  on 
developments  on  the  exchange  rate  front.  In 
countries  whose  currencies  remained  strong 
(Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  France,  the 
Netherlands and  Austria),  increases in import prices 
remained  subdued  (sec  Table  7.3),  and  their 
contributions  to  final  demand  inflation  were  still 
negative in  1993  and  marginally positive in  1994-95 
(see  Table 7.4).  On  the  other  hand,  in  those  countries  which  experienced  marked 
depreciation between  1993  and  1995  (Spain,  Italy,  Sweden  and  the  United Kingdom), 
import  prices  increased  strongly  over  the  period:  However,  the  knock-on  effects  on 
domestic inflation were relatively limited, particularly owing to the appropriate economic 
policy response, but also to the weak growth environment prevailing in these countries. 
Most commodity prices have experienced another fall since mid-1996 (see Graph 7.1 ).  On 
the other hand, the dollar has recovered somewhat since mid-1995.  European currencies 
which depreciated significantly in early 1995  also strengthened during the course of I  Q9 5 
and 1996. Consequently, the rise in import prices should remain moderate throughout the 
Community in  1996. Their contributions to overall inflation  are thus expected to narrow 
in Member States whose currencies have appreciated recently, and to remain moderate in 
other Member States (around 0.5%). 69 
Table 7.4  Table 7.5 
Contribution of  import prices to the 
change of the final uses deflator. 
Nominal effective exchange rate changes 
relative to 23 industrial countries; 
(percentage change)  (annual percentage changes) 
1993  1994  1995  1996 
(l)  1993  1994  1995  1996 
B  -1.0  0.4  0.2  0.6  (1) 
DK  -0.3  0.1  0.3  0.5  !3/L  1.4  2.6  5.4  -1.4 
D  -0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  DK  3.1  0.8  5.1  -0.4 
EL  1.9  1.7  1.5  0.9  D  4.1  2.0  6.8  -1.6 
E  1.1  1.0  0.8  0.2  EL  -7.0  -4.8  -1.5  -0.8 
F  -0.4  0.3  0.2  0.3  E  -ll.5  -5.3  1.2  1.7 
IRL  1.5  1.0  1.5  0.2  F  3.0  2.0  4.7  0.8 
I  2.0  0.8  2.0  -0.1  IRL  -5.3  0.7  0.6  1.9 
L  2.6  0.1  0.2  1.4  I  -15.8  -2.5  -8.0  9.7 
NL  -0.7  0.2  0.1  0.6 
A  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3 
p  2.4  1.2  0.4  0.4 
NL  3.7  1.5  4.8  -1.4 
A  3.3  1.2  4.2  -1.3 
p  -6.3  -3.7  2.3  -0.2 
FIN  1.8  -0.1  0.1  0.5 
s  3.0  0.8  1.2  -0.8 
UK  1.7  0.4  1.6  0.4 
FIN  -13.0  9.0  11.4  -2.5 
s  -18.5  -0.3  0.4  10.1 
UK  -7.9  1.5  -3.4  0.6 
( 1) Autumn 1996 economic forecasts. 
Sourer: Commission services. 
EUR(2)  -10.5  3.4  7.9  4.7 
(1) Based on the geometric average of  monthly 
exchange rates until23 October 1996. 
(2) Relative to 9 non-member countries. USA, 
Japan, Mexico, Canada, Switzerland, Nonvay, 
Australia, New Zealand and Turkey. 
Source: Commission services. 70 
7. 4. 3.  Effects of  indirect tax changes on inflation 
Although during  Stage Two the progress in  budgetary consolidation has  been achieved 
predominantly  through a  reduction in  the  share  of government  expenditure  relative  to 
GDP,  all Member States have also made usc of increases in indirect taxes to this end but 
Table 7.6. 
Effects of indirect tax changes 
on consumer price inflation 
(percentage points) 
1994  1995  1996 
B  0.7  0.1  0.2 
DK  0.4  0.4  0.4 
D  0.4  0.0  -0.2 
GR  0.8  0.6  0.8 
E  0.3  1.0  0.2 
F  0.1  1.1  0.1 
IRL  0.3  0.1  0.2 
I  0.3  0.8  0.0 
L  0.1  0.1  0.0 
NL  0.2  0.1  0.4 
A  0.2  0.5  0.2 
p  0.2  0.5  ..0.2 
FIN  0.7  1.1  0.7 
s  0.3  0.4  0.3 
UK  0.7  0.6  0.4 
Source: Commission services. 
to  varying  degree.  In  several  countries,  increases  in 
indirect taxes have contributed importantly to increases in 
inflation,  as  is  suggested  in  Table  7.6  which  shows 
estimates  of the  direct  mechanical  impact  under  the 
assumption of a full  pass-through of changes in indirect 
taxes to consumer prices. 
The  most  important  contributions  of  indirect  tax 
increases  to  inflation  have  been  observed  in  Belgium 
(I  994), France (1995), Italy (1995), Finland (1995-1996) 
and  the  United Kingdom  (1994-95).  However,  more 
than the direct impact - which is,  by definition,  a one-off 
effect - what matters is the risk that increases in indirect 
taxes  raise  inflation  expectations  and  thus  trigger  a 
wage/price spiral.  This does not appear to have been the 
case  in  any  of these  countries.  After  showing  a  blip 
during  the  year  in  which  increases  in  indirect  tax 
occurred,  inflation  came  down  swiftly  to  its  previous 
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8. CONCLUDING SUMMARY 
8.1 General assessment 
This report has been prepared in accordance with the procedure and timetable set out 
in Article 109j ofthe Treaty. 
Substantial  progress  towards  the  achievement  of  a  high  degree  of sustainable 
convergence has been made in  all  Member States since  the ·beginning of the second 
stage of EMU.  This progress gathered greater momentum during  1996, when efforts 
to  achieve  convergence  (especially  in  the  budgetary field)  were intensified  in  many 
Member States. Other necessary preparations for the third stage are also advancing at 
the national level and at Community level,  where during the past year agreement has 
been  reached  on  the  scenario  for  the  introduction  of the  single  currency,  the 
Commission has recently presented proposals for the legal status of  the euro and for a 
stability pact to ensure budgetary discipline in the third stage, a consensus is  emerging 
on the  design  of the  so-called  "ERM II"  and  a  communication  campaign  has  been 
launched. 
The  examination  in  Chapter 2  of this  report  of the  compatibility  between  national 
legislation and Articles 107 and 108 ofthe Treaty and the Statute of  the ESCB first of 
all set out the requirements that will have to be satisfied by the start of stage three. It 
then identified types of existing provisi'ons,  mainly in the statutes of national central 
banks, which do not yet conform. In virtually all Member States there continue to exist 
prov1sions that will need to be amended. Several Member States are preparing or have 
already brought forward proposals for shanges in their legislation. 
b  the next four chapters progress by each Member State in relation to  each of the 
convergence criteria has been examined. 
The  steady  progress  made  in  the  European  Union  as  a  whole  and  by  individual 
Member States in moving towards or maintaining a high degree of price stability has 
continued in  1996.  The assessment of price  convergence bas  been  made using  the 
recently  available  interim  indices  of consumer  prices  (IICPs),  which  arc  more 
comparable than national indices but not yet fully  harmonised.  The  average  rate of 
inflation for each Member State has been calculated as  the percentage change in the 
average IICP  in  the latest  12 months relative to the average index in the preceding 
12 months.  The reference value has been calculated for the purpose of this  report as 
the simple arithmetic average of  the average inflation rates in the three best performing 
Member States nlus 1.5 percentage points.  Calculated in this way and according to the 
latest available information (September 1996),  the three best price performers were 
Finland,  the  Netherlands  and  Germany,  and  the  reference  value  was  2.6%  (see 
Table 8.1).  Ten  Member  States  (Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  France,  Ireland, 
Luxem~1ourg, the Netherlands,  Austria,  Finland  and  Sweden)  had  average  inflation 
rates below this reference value. A box in Chapter 3· shows that the number of  Member 
States respecting the price stability criterion is not at present sensitive to the method 
chosen to calculate the reference value. Five Member States still have average inflation 
rates above the reference value in  September (Greece, Spain,  Italy,  Portugal and  the 
United Kingdom), but the differentials have tended to narrow in recent years and again I 
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in 1996. Portugal and the United Kingdom arc less than ~  percentage point above the 
reference value. 
Only three Member States (Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg) arc currently not the 
subject of a Council Decision on the existence of an excessive government deficit and 
so  respect  the. criterion  on  the  government  budgetary  position.  The  most  recent 
decisions under the excessive deficit procedure (Article 1  04c) were made in June 1996. 
Chapter 4 also  reviewed  budgetary developments  in  the Member States  during  the 
second  stage and  presented estimates of likely  outturns in  1996.  Significant  progress 
has been made since 1993 by most Member States in reducing government deficits; in 
1996  four  countries  (Denmark,  Ireland,  Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands)  arc 
expected to achieve a government balance better than the 3% ofGDP deficit reference 
Table 8.1 
Performance of the Member States in relation to conrergcnce in 1996 
Inflation  General ~oYcrnment budgetary position  Exchange  Long-term 
rates  interest rates 
Interim  Existence  Deficit 
index of  of  (%of  Debt  ERM 
consumer  an excessi\'e  GDP)  (% ofGDP)  participation 
prices  deficit  (2)  (2) 
(1) 
Council  '. 
Oct.  1995  decisions,  Change  October  Oct. 1995 
- 26.9.1994,  1996  1996  1996  -
Sep. 1996  10.7.1995 and  94/93  95194  96195  Sep. 1996 
27.6.1996 
Reference 
2.6 (3)  3.0  60  8.7 {4)  value 
B  1.6  yes  __  3.3  130.6  -2.0  -1.3  -3.1  yes  6.7 
DK  2.2  no  1.4  70.2  -4.1  -4.1  -1.7  yes  7.4 
D  1.3  yes  4.0  60.8  2.2  7.7  2.7  yes  6.3 
EL  8.4  yes  7.9  110.6  -1.4  1.4  -1.2  no  15.1 
E  3.8  yes.  4.4  67.8  ~.6  2.6  2.1  yes  9.5 
F  2.1  yes  4.0  56.4  2.8  4.4  3.6  yes  6.6 
IRL  2.1 (5)  no  1.6  74.7  -6.6  -6.3  -6.9  yes  7.5 
I  4.7  yes  6.6  123.4  6.2  -0.6  -1.5  no  10.3 
L  1.3  no  -0.9  7.8  -0.5  0.3  1.8  yes  7.0 
l--!'L  1.2  yes  2.6  78.7  -3.4  2.3  -1.0  yes  6.3 
A  1.7  yes  4.3  71.7  2.3  3.9  2.7  yes  6.5 
p  3.0  yes  4.0  71.1  1.4  2.1  -0.6  yes  9.4 
FIN  0.9  yes  3.3  61.3  2.2  -0.3  2.1  yes  7.4 
s  1.6  yes  3.9  78.1  3.3  -O.G  -0.6  no  8.5 
UK  3.0  yes  4.6  56.3  1.9  3.7  2.2  no  8.0 
EUR  2.7  I  . 4.4  73.5  2.0  3.2  2.2  I  7.6 
(1) Percentage change in average level of  index in latest 12 months over average in previous 12 month period 
(2) Estimates from Commission services' Autumn 1996 Economic Forecasts. 
(3) Definition adopted in tlus report:  aritlunetic average of  the three best performers in terms of  inflation plus 
I. 5 percentage points. 
(  4) Definition adopted in tl1is report: arithmetic average of  the 12-month average of  interest rates of  the tluee best 
perfonning Member States in terms of price stability plus 2 percentage points. 
(5) Measured on the b:tSis of  quarterly data. 
Source: Commission services. 74 
value; Belgium and Finland are likely to have deficits. smaller than 3Y:z%  of GDP.  By 
the end of 1996  three Member States (France, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom) 
are expected to have a government gross debt ratio below the 60% of GDP reference 
value. In Germany and Finland, the debt ratio is likely to exceed the reference value of 
60%  by  the  end  of 1996,  after having  been consistently  below that value.  Several 
Member States have succeeded in reversing the earlier upward trend in the debt ratio, 
with  a  steady  reduction  since  1993  in  Belgium,  Denmark  and  Ireland  and  declines 
expected in  1996 also in Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. 
Since the turbulence in foreign exchange markets that led  to the realignment in March 
1995  within  the  ERM of the  Spanish  peseta,  followed  by  the  Portuguese  escudo, 
exchange rate conditions have not been subject to severe tensions and the gap between 
the strongest and weakest currencies within the ERM band has tended to narrow (as 
described  in  Chapter 5).  There  arc  currently  eleven  currencies  participating  in  the 
E!Uv1.  Nine of these (the currencies of Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  Spain,  France, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal) have been members of the ERM 
for well over two years. Austria joined the ERM at the beginning of 1995 and Finland 
in the middle of October 1996.  Four Member States (Greece, Italy,  Sweden and  the 
United Kingdom)  are not currently participating in  the ERM; the last  three of these 
countries  have  seen  a  significant  appreciation  of their  currencies  during  1996, 
following the weakness of  earlier years. 
The fourth criterion, on the durability of  convergence as reflected in long-term interest 
rates, has been examined in Chapter 6.  The assessment is based on the interest rates on 
comparable  1  0-year benchmark bonds (not fully  comparable for  Greece)  , using  an 
average rate over the latest 12 months. The reference value has been calculated as the 
simple arithmetic average of the long-term interest rates of the three best performing 
Member States in terms of price stability nlus 2 percentage points. In September 1996 
the reference value was 8.7%. Eleven Member States (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
France,  Ireland,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands,  Austria,  Finland,  Sweden  and  the 
United Kingdom) have average interest rates below the reference value. Developments 
in  bond  markets  during  1996,  and  especially  in  September,  have  resulted  in  a 
significant narrowing in interest rate differentials, especially among the higher-yielding 
countries where the criterion is not yet respected. 
The Treaty also requires that this report should examine developments in several other 
areas  relevant  to  economic  integration  and  convergence.  These  are  dealt  with  in 
Chapter 7.  Financial markets in ECU have tended to decline in importance since the 
severe currency turbulence of 1992 and  1993,  but significant amounts of commercial 
transactions are settled in  ECU.  The spread between the private and  public ECU is 
reducing as the certainty of  the 1 for I convertibility between the ECU and the euro is 
incorporated by the markets.· The Single Market project has been having a significant 
impact on economic integration, ·particularly on the structure of  tradP between Member 
States,  on foreign direct investment flows,  on competition conditions and  on price 
convergence for certain categories of goods and services. The current account of the 
balance of  payments reflects the national savings in  each Member State; the European 
Union  as  a  whole and  ten Member States  are  expected  to  be  in  surplus  in  1996. 
Additional indicators for unit labour costs and import prices confirm the picture given 75 
in Chapter 3 of a  satisfactory and soundly based price performance in most Member 
States. 
Mainly as a consequence ofthe persistence ofbudgetary imbalances (although they are 
being reduced) and as illustrated by the existence of excessive governme:.1t  deficits in 
twelve Member States, it is clear that currently a majority of Member States has not 
yet  made  sufficient  progress  in  the  achievement  of a  high  degree  of sustainable 
convergence. 
8.2 Summary by Member States 
In this final  section of  the report performance in relation to the convergence criteria is 
presented  on  a  country-by-country  basis  in  accordance with  Article I 09j(l)  which 
requires  an  examination  of  the  achievement  of  a  high  degree  of  sustainable 
convergence by reference to the fulfilment by each Member State of the criteria. The 
criteria  on  inflation  and  long-term  interest  rates  have  been  examined  using  data 
covering  the  period  up  to  September 1996.  The  reference value  has,  in  both cases, 
been calculated using the average of  the three best performing Member States in terms 
of inflation.  As regards the criterion on the government budgetary position,  where 
relevant, Commission estimates of  budgetary data for 1996 as a whole arc presented. 
In Be1gium the average inflation rate in the year ending in September 1996 stood at 
1.6% which is  below the reference value; during the same period nominal long-term 
interest rates were, on average,  6. 7% which is  also  below the reference value.  The 
Council has not yet abrogated its Decision of 26 September 1994 according to which 
an  excessive government deficit exists in  Belgium.  In 1996 the general government 
deficit  is  expected  to  be reduced  by  0.8 percentage  points  to  3.3%  of GDP;  the 
government gross debt ratio is likely to decline from 133.7% ofGDP in 1995 to 130.6 
%  in  1996. Belgium has been a member of the ERM since its inception; in the latest 
two years the BFR has respected the fluctuation margins of  the ERM and has not been 
subject to severe tensions and the BFR  bila~eral central rate has not been devalued. 
In Denmark the average inflation rate in the year ending in September 1996 stood at 
2.2% which is  below the reference value;  during the same period nominal long-term 
interest rates were, on average,  ?.4% which is  also  below the reference value.  The 
Council decided on 27 June 1996 to  abrvgate its  Decision of 26 September 1994 on 
the  existence  of an excessive government deficit  in Denmark.  In  1996 the general 
government deficit  is  expected to  be  reduced  by 0.2 percentage  points to  1.4% of 
GDP; the government gross debt ratio is  likely  to  decline further to 70.2% in  1996 
from  71.9% of GDP  in  1995.  Denmark has  been  a  member of the  ERM since its 
inception; in the latest two years the DKR has respected the fluctuation margins of  the 
ERM and has not been subject to severe tensions and the DKR bilateral central rate 
has not bet:n devalued. 
In Germany the average inflation rate in the year· ending in  September 1996 stood at. 
1.3%  which  is  the  third  best  performance  in  the  EU  and  is  therefore  below  the 
reference value;  during the  same  period  nominal  long-term interest  rates were,  on 
average,  6.3%  which  is  also  below  the  reference  value.  The  Council  decided  on 
27 June 1996  that an  excessive  government  deficit  exists  in  Germany.  In  1996  the 76 
. ·general government deficit is expected to increase to 4.0% ofGDP from 3.5% in  1995~ 
the government  gross  debt  ratio  which  has  been  below  60%  of GDP  is  likely  to 
increase in 1996 reaching 60.8o/o'  of GDP.  Germany has been a member of the ERM 
since its inception; in the latest two years the DM has respected the fluctuation margins 
of the ERM and has not been subject to severe tensions and the DM bilateral central 
rate has not been devalued.  · 
In Greece the average inflation rate in the year ending in  September I 996 stood at 
8.4% which is significantly above the reference value; during the same period nominal 
long-term  interest rates  were,  on  average,· 15.1 %,  also  clearly  above the reference 
value. The Council has not yet abrogated its Decision of  26 September 1994 according 
to  which  an  excessive  government  deficit  exists  in  Greece.  In  1996  the  general 
government  deficit is  expected  to  be  reduced  by  1.2 percentage  points  to 7.9% of 
GDP;  the government gross debt  ratio  is  likely  to  decline  from  111.8% of GDP .in 
1995 to 110.6% in 1996. The DR does not participate in the ERM. 
In Spain thr average inflation rate in the year ending in September 1996 stood at 3.8% 
which is above the reference value; during the same period nominal long-term interest 
rates were, on average, 9.5% which is also above the reference value. The Council has 
not yet abrogated its Decision of  26 September 1994 according to which ail excessive 
government deficit exists in Spain. In 1996 the general government deficit is expected 
to be reduced by 2.2 percentage points to 4.4% of GDP; the government gross debt 
ratio is likely to increase from 65.7% of GDP in  1995 to 67.8% in 1996.  Spain has 
been a member of  the ERM since June 1989;in March 1995 the bilateral central rate of 
the peseta was devalued by 7%,  at the initiative of Spain;  since then the PTA has 
respected  the fluctuation margins  of the ERM and  has  not been subject  to  severe 
tensions. 
In France the average inflation rate in the year ending in  September 1996 stood at 
2.1% whir;h is  below the reference value;  during the same period nominal long-term 
interest rates were, on average,  6.6% which is  also  below the  refere~ce value.  The 
Council has not yet abrogated its Decision of  26 Septembrr 1994 according to which 
an excessive  government deficit  exists  in  France.  In  1996  the  general  government 
deficit  is  expected  to  be  reduced  by  0.8 percentage  points  to  4.0%  of GDP;  the 
government gross debt ratio continues to be below 60% of GDP in 1996. France has 
been a  member of the ER1v1  sinct- its  inceptbn;  in the latest  two years  the FF has 
respected  the fluctuation ·margins  of the  ERM and  has  not been  subject  to 'severe 
tensions and the FF bilateral central rate has not been devalued. 
In Ireland the average inflation rate in  the year ending in September 1996 stood at 
2.1% which is  below the reference value; during the same  p~riod nominal long-term 
interest rates were, on average, 7.5% which is  also below the reference value. Ireland 
is not the subject ofa Council decision on the existence of an excessive government 
deficit. The general government deficit has been be~ow 3% of GDP since 1989 and is 
expected to· be reduced further by 0.4 percentage points to 1.6% of GDP in 1996; the 
government gross debt ratio is likely to decline further to 74.7% in 1996 from 81.6% 
of GDP in  I 995.  Ireland has been a member of the ERM since its inception; in  the 
latest two years the IRL has respected the fluctuation margins of  the ERM and has not 77 
been  subject  to  severe  tensions  and  the  IRL  bilateral  central  rate  has  not  been 
devalued. 
In Italy the average inflation rate in the year ending in September 1996 stood at 4.7% 
which is  clearly above the reference value;  during the same period nominal long-term 
interest rates were,  on average,  10.3% which is  also  above the reference value.  The 
Council has not yet abrogated its Decision of 26 September 1994 according to which 
an excessive government deficit exists in Italy. In 1996 the general government deficit 
is  expected to  be  reduced by  0.5 percentage points to 6.6% of GDP; the government 
gross debt ratio is likely to decline from 124.9% of  GDP in  1995 to 123.4 % in  1996. 
Italy was a member of the ERM from  its  inception until  September  1992 when the 
intervention obligations for the LIT were suspended;  since then the LIT has  not re-
entered the ERM. · 
In Luxembourg the average inflation rate in the year ending in September 1996 stood 
at 1.3% which is below the reference value;  during the same period nominal long-term 
interest  rates  were,  on  c.verage,  7.0%  which  is  also  below  the  reference  value. 
Luxembourg is not the subject of a Council decision on the existence of an excessive 
government deficit. The general government financial position has traditionally been in 
a surplus,  expected to amount to 0.9% of GDP in 1996. The government gross debt 
ratio continues to remain significantly below 60% of GDP. Luxembourg has been a 
member of the ERM since its inception; in the latest two years the LFR has respected 
the fluctuation margins of  the ERM and has not been subject to severe tensions ·and the 
LFR bilateral central rate has not been devalued.  · 
In the Netherlands the average inflation rate in  the year ending in September 1996 
stood at 1.2% which is the second best performance in the EU and is therefore below 
the reference value; during the same period nominal long-term interest rates were,  on 
average,  6.3%  which  is  also  below  the  reference  value.  The Council  has  not  yet 
abrogated  its  Decision  of 26 September 1994  according  to  which  an  excessive 
government deficit exists in the Netherlands. In 1996 the general government deficit is 
expected to be reduced  by  1.4 percentage points to 2.6% of GDP;  the government 
gross debt ratio is  likely to decline from 79.7% of GDP in 1995 to 78.7% in  1996. 
The Netherlands have been a member of the ERM since its inception; in the>  latest two 
years the HFL  has respected the fluctuation margins of the ERM and  has not been 
subject to severe tensions and the HFL bilateral central rate has not been devalued. 
In Austria the average inflation rate in the year ending in  September 1996 stood at 
1. 7% which is  below the reference value;  during the same period nominal long-tenn 
interest rates were,  on average,  6.5%  which is  also  below the reference value.  The 
Council has  not yet  abrogated  its Decision of 10 July 1995  according  to  which  an 
excessive government deficit exists in Austria. In 1996 the general government· deficit 
is expected to be reduced by  1.6 percentage points to 4.3% of  GDP~ the government 
gross debt ratio is  likely to increase from 69.0% of GDP in 1995  to 71.7% in  1996. 
Austria has been a member of the ERM since early January 1995; since then the OS 
has respected the. fluctuation margins of the ERM and has not been subject to severe 
tensions and the OS bilateral central rate has not been devalued. 78 
In Portugal the average inflation rate in the year ending in  September I 996 stood at 
3.0% which is  above the reference value;  during the same  period  nominal  long-term 
interest rates  were,  on average,  9.4% which  is. also  above  the  reference value.  The 
Council has not yet abrogated its Decision of 26 September 1994 according to which 
an excessive government deficit exists in  Portugal.  In  1996  the general government 
deficit  is  expected  to  be reduced  by  1.1  percentage  points  to  4.0%  of GDP;  the 
government gross debt ratio is likely to decline from 71. 7.% of GDP in  1995 to 71.1% 
in 1996. Portugal has been a member of  the ERM since April  1992.  In March  1995, 
following  the  devaluation  of the  Spanish  peseta,  the  bilateral  central  rate  of the 
Portuguese escudo  was  devalued  by  3.5%.  Since  then  the  ESC  has  respected  the 
fluctuation margins of  the ERM and has not been subject to severe tensions. 
In Finland the average inflation rate in  the year ending in  September 1996  stood at 
0.9%  w~1ich is  the best performance in  the  EU and  is  therefore below the  reference 
value; during the same period nominal long-term interest rates were, on average, 7.4% 
which is also below the reference value. The ·council has not yet abrogated its Decision 
of I 0 July 1995 according to which an excessive government deficit exists in Finland. 
In 1996 the general government deficit is  expected to be  reduced by  1.9 percentage 
points to 3.3% ofGDP; the government gross debt ratio which has been below 60% of 
GDP is likely to increase in 1996, reaching 61.3% ofGDP. Finland has been a member 
ofthe ERM since mid-October 1996. 
In Sweden the average inflation rate in the year ending in  September 1996 stood at 
1.6% which is  below the reference· value;  during the same period nominal long-term 
interest rates were, on average, 8.5% which is below the reference value. The Council 
has not yet abrogated its Decision of 10 July 1995  according to which an excessive 
government  deficit  exists  in  Sweden.  In  1996  the  general  government  deficit  is 
expected to  be. reduced by  4.2 percentage points  to 3.9% of GDP;  the government 
gross debt ratio is likely to decline from 78.7% ofGDP in 1995 to 78.1% in 1996. The 
SKR docs not participate in the ERM. 
In  the  United  Kingdom  the  average  inflation  rate  in  the  year  ending  in 
September 1996 stood at 3.0% which is  above the reference value;  during the same 
period nominal  long-term interest rates were,  on average,  8.0%  which is  below the 
reference value. The Council has not yet abrogated its Decision of  26 September 1994 
according to which an excessive government deficit exists in  the United Kingdom.  In 
1996  the  general  government  deficit  is  expected  to  be  reduced  by  1.2 percentage 
points to 4.6% ofGDP; the government gross debt ratio continues to be below 60% of 
GDP in 1996. The currency ofthe United Kingdom entered the ERMin October 1990; 
the participation of the UKL in  the ERM was suspended in  September 1992 and  has 
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